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## Building Partner Capacity: US Aid to Security Sector Actors

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Keywords:	foreign aid, foreign policy, human rights, international security, national security, military aid, security sector assistance
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Abstract:	<p>This article introduces the US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset, the product of a collaboration between academic researchers and the nonprofit Security Assistance Monitor. In addition to providing the most comprehensive source of data on US security assistance, the USASSA dataset transforms detailed information about how security assistance funds are spent into aid and recipient typologies that can be used to conduct more sophisticated analyses of how this foreign policy tool is employed, its utility, and its limitations. Our data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic reach of US security assistance, but also its diversity. While some SSA is akin to humanitarian aid, other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and proxy warfare. We demonstrate the utility of the dataset with an exploration of whether the effects of US security assistance on human rights violations and domestic terrorism vary across types of aid.</p>

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3 Over the past two decades, there have been tremendous advances in the availability and quality  
4 of data on development, humanitarian, and governance aid; and these advances have enabled  
5 significant progress in empirical research on the myriad impacts of this aid. The same is not true  
6 for military aid. Although security assistance is a substantial and growing component of the  
7 foreign policy toolkits of powerful states, and security aid could have more severe unintended  
8 consequences than other forms of aid, multiple barriers to collecting comprehensive and detailed  
9 data on security assistance have stymied research in this area. Does providing security assistance  
10 to fragile states like Somalia increase or decrease the risk of civilian harm? Does assistance  
11 provided during an armed conflict affect peacebuilding after war termination? What are the  
12 effects of military aid provided to a state's security forces during governance transitions? Are  
13 security sector reform and defense institution building programs effective? These questions and  
14 many more can only be adequately explored if scholars have access to high quality data.

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31 In this article we introduce a new dataset, the product of a collaboration between  
32 academic researchers and the nonprofit Security Assistance Monitor (SAM), that combines all  
33 publicly available data on US security aid provided to foreign militaries, police, and other  
34 security sector actors into a comprehensive, global dataset. While details on many security  
35 assistance activities are available from government reports and NGOs, much of the more  
36 granular information is not consolidated and coded in a way that would allow for systematic  
37 analysis. Security assistance authorities fund a wide range of activities, including training and  
38 equipping militaries for combat, law enforcement training, building special forces units,  
39 institutional reform, humanitarian assistance, counterproliferation initiatives, and English  
40 language courses. Moreover, US security assistance is provided to a range of security sector  
41 actors within countries: police forces, army units, civilians in defense ministries, air force pilots,  
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3 and border guards, among others. In addition to providing the most comprehensive source of data  
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5 on US security assistance, this dataset transforms detailed information about how security  
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7 assistance funds are spent into aid and recipient typologies that can be used to conduct more  
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9 sophisticated analyses of how this foreign policy tool is employed, its utility, and its limitations.  
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11 All of these variables are available in two versions of the dataset. In the first version, each of the  
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13 32,008 observations is an item (or items) of US security aid provided between 2000 and  
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15 2019 and variables identify the country or geographic region that received the assistance,  
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17 funding amount in US dollars (current and constant), fiscal year in which the aid was  
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19 disbursed, security assistance program under which the aid was authorized, and aid and  
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21 recipient type indicators. In the second version, there is an observation for each United Nations  
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23 member state in every year from 2000 to 2019. Variables record the total amount of security  
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25 assistance a country received (if any), the amount of assistance the country received in each  
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27 of the thirteen *aid type* categories, the amount of assistance provided to each *recipient type*,  
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29 the amounts provided under Department of Defense and Department of State authorities,  
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31 and the amount provided under each security assistance program.  
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38 Interest in security assistance has surged due in part to the United States' massive and  
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40 costly efforts to train and equip state security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also in response  
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42 to the apparent effectiveness of Western security aid to Ukraine, and growing awareness of  
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44 security force capacity-building on the African continent. We believe this dataset can advance  
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46 scholarship and inform important policy debates. In the remainder of this article, we introduce  
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48 readers to the US security assistance landscape and briefly describe some of the unique  
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50 challenges to collecting comprehensive data on security aid. We then explain how the dataset  
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52 was created and provide descriptive statistics. Next, we demonstrate the utility of the data by  
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3 exploring whether the effects of US security assistance on human rights violations and domestic  
4 terrorism vary across types of aid. We conclude with a discussion of the need for this dataset and  
5 the ways that it could advance research.  
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## 10 11 12 **US Security Sector Assistance**

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14 The United States is by far the largest provider of security assistance worldwide. Security  
15 assistance managed by the State Department, often implemented by the Department of Defense  
16 (DoD), is authorized under Title 22 of the US Code. The DoD is given similar authorities under  
17 Title 10. Security assistance may also be authorized in the annual National Defense  
18 Authorization Act (NDAA) and funded in Defense appropriations bills. Various agencies of the  
19 US government and the armed forces use different terms for the vast array of legal authorities  
20 (programs)<sup>i</sup> that provide military training, equipment, advising, and education to foreign security  
21 forces. We use the broad terms *security assistance*, *security sector assistance*, and *military aid* to  
22 encompass all such programs.  
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35 The United States has provided some form of security assistance to at least 179 of the 193  
36 United Nations member countries over the past twenty years. Between 2000 and 2019, the US  
37 delivered security assistance worth over 340 billion USD, an average of \$17 billion a year, to  
38 foreign governments and their security sectors.<sup>ii</sup> Spending on training and equipping foreign  
39 security forces, defense institution building, law enforcement training, and a wide range of other  
40 activities funded by security assistance programs increased more than 350% in real terms  
41 between 2001 and 2007. At the same time, the proportion of funding managed by the  
42 Department of Defense versus the Department of State shifted from 8% DoD, 92% State in 2000,  
43 to 62% DoD, 38% State in 2007.  
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3           Unfortunately, there are significant obstacles to collecting comprehensive, detailed data  
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5 on the incredibly vast and complex assortment of legal authorities and funding authorizations  
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7 that comprise the US security sector assistance enterprise. Despite the significant sums budgeted  
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9 for foreign security assistance, and an increasing reliance on this tool in US national security  
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11 strategy, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation requirements for security assistance are far less  
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13 stringent than those placed on economic aid (Marquis et al. 2016; Miller and Mahanty April 14,  
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15 2020). As a result, even Congress, which has a mandate to provide oversight of the security  
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17 assistance programs they authorize, does not have easy access to a comprehensive picture of how  
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19 the funding they allocate is spent (Serafino 2016).  
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24           Security assistance funds managed by the Department of Defense are particularly  
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26 challenging to track due to frequent changes in accounts and programs, poor recordkeeping, and  
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28 laxer requirements for reporting than State Department programs (Isacson and Kinosian 2017;  
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30 Serafino 2016; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2018). After 9/11, Congress granted  
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32 dozens of new security cooperation authorities to the Department of Defense, giving the DoD a  
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34 greatly expanded role in building the capacity of foreign forces, increasing not just the amount of  
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36 funding for these activities, but the number of state recipients as well (Epstein and Rosen 2018).  
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38 The majority of new DoD security assistance authorities were originally designed to be  
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40 temporary programs to address immediate threats. In practice, many programs have endured. In a  
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42 series of reports, the Congressional Research Service bemoans the difficulty of obtaining data on  
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44 security sector assistance programs, noting that inconsistent Congressional notification  
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46 requirements make it impossible to get a “full and authoritative accounting” of US security  
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48 assistance funding around the world (Serafino 2014, 26), and that the ambiguity built into DoD  
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3 programs in particular makes it “difficult to understand what, specifically, the DoD is doing to  
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5 build partner capacity” (McInnis and Lucas 2015, 1).  
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8 This project is an attempt to provide researchers, policymakers, and the public with a full  
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10 accounting of US security sector aid spending across the globe, and to delve into the specifics of  
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12 what goods and services are being provided to which security sector actors with these funds.  
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### 15 16 **The USASSA Dataset**

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18 The US Aid to Security Sector Actors (USASSA) dataset aims to consolidate all  
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20 available unclassified data on US aid provided to foreign militaries, police, and other security  
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22 sector actors between 2000 and 2019. Recognizing that, unlike other types of foreign aid,  
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24 comprehensive information on security assistance was not easily accessible to policymakers or  
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26 the public, in 2014 the Center for International Policy (CIP) founded the Security Assistance  
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28 Monitor (SAM) program to collect and analyze information on US security sector assistance  
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30 programs worldwide. SAM compiles its data from government documents including, for  
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32 example, Congressional appropriation bills, budget justifications, and reports from the US State  
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34 Department, Department of Defense, Congressional Research Service, and Government  
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36 Accountability Office. Some government reports are obtained through Freedom of Information  
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38 Act (FOIA) requests.  
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44 The Security Assistance Monitor’s data<sup>iii</sup> are searchable via interactive dashboards on  
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46 SAM’s website and extremely useful for getting a macro-level view of aid amounts provided to  
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48 countries over time, or drilling down into specifics on aid provided for a particular country. In  
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50 addition to media outlets, it is not uncommon for policymakers and even military officials to turn  
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52 to the Security Assistance Monitor for information on US security aid programs. However, the  
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54 data are not widely used for academic analyses because the most detailed information is not  
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3 comprehensive (i.e., available for all programs, countries, and years), and valuable information is  
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5 lost at higher levels of aggregation (e.g., the country-year level of analysis). To remedy this, we  
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7 set out to produce a dataset that would be better suited to academic research and, in particular,  
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9 quantitative analyses.  
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12 This collaboration between academic researchers and staff from the Security Assistance  
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14 Monitor:

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17 1) combines all publicly available data into a comprehensive, global dataset at the country-  
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19 year level of analysis, including observations for all United Nations member states in  
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21 every year from 2000 to 2019
- 22  
23 2) expands and verifies SAM's existing data with additional information collected from a  
24  
25 wide range of government documents, media reports, and secondary source material;
- 26  
27 3) codes qualitative information contained in SAM's records, and supplemental sources,  
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29 into categorical variables useful for quantitative analyses; and
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31 4) provides a complete bibliography of sources  
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### 38 **Data Set Construction**

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40 To create the dataset, we began with the information the Security Assistance Monitor had  
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42 collected about US foreign security assistance programs worldwide at two levels of analysis.  
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44 Each of the almost fifteen thousand observations at the *recipient-program-year* level identifies  
45  
46 the recipient country or region, delivery year, the amount of aid in US dollars, and the security  
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48 assistance program under which the aid is provided. Each of the 23,878 observations at the *line*  
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50 *item* level of analysis (observations for a subset of the recipient-program-year level data  
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52 representing just under 50% of total security assistance provided between 2000 and 2019)  
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3 contains a short description of the security assistance “item” provided and a source material  
4 reference, in addition to aid amount, recipient, year, and program information. An item could be  
5 a material object or objects (a tank, weapon system, or uniforms); a training activity, military  
6 exercise, or educational course; or a direct service provided by American personnel like  
7 demining or transportation. We discuss these different types of aid in more detail below.  
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15 These two sources of data were reconciled to create one dataset with comprehensive data  
16 at the line item level. Security aid amounts for which we had information about the recipient,  
17 program, and year, but no matching line item details, were retained as observations with missing  
18 information in the item description. To provide readers with a better sense of the range of item  
19 descriptions in the SAM data, a sample of observations for Niger between 2012 and 2014 is  
20 provided in Appendix B.  
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29 The university research team, composed of a faculty principal investigator (PI) and  
30 student research assistants, then created two additional variables for each observation—*aid type*  
31 and *recipient type*. *Aid type* is a categorical variable with twelve categories specifying the nature  
32 of the assistance item provided. *Recipient type* classifies the individual, unit, or agency to which  
33 the assistance was provided.  
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#### 40 ***Coding aid type and recipient type***

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42 The PI, a lead graduate student RA, and three undergraduate research assistants conducted a  
43 preliminary round of coding for *aid type* between May and August 2021. In this round of coding,  
44 there were five aid type categories and coders used only the information SAM staff had recorded  
45 to determine which aid type category to code. Working with these data, and in discussions with  
46 staff at the Security Assistance Monitor over the course of the next year, the PI refined and  
47 expanded the aid type categories and developed recipient type categories. The aid type categories  
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3 and abbreviated operational definitions are listed in Table 1. The seven recipient type categories  
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5 are (1) ground forces, (2) air forces, (3) naval/riverine forces, (4) police, (5) special  
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7 forces/internal security units, (6) civilians (including general population, government ministers,  
8  
9 and civil servants), and (7) multiple branches of the armed forces or unspecified security forces.  
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11 The complete codebook is provided in Appendix A online. The aid and recipient type categories  
12  
13 are mutually exclusive and exhaustive so that each item is coded as only one aid and recipient  
14  
15 type.  
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20 [Table 1]  
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24 Beginning in 2022, the team began to recode the *aid type* and *recipient type* variables  
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26 according to the new operational definitions. Working program by program, the team used the  
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28 item descriptions and the original source materials referenced by SAM to determine the aid and  
29  
30 recipient type for each “item” provided within a given security assistance program. If the original  
31  
32 source documentation did not provide enough information to code the aid and recipient type, the  
33  
34 coder would conduct an internet search for additional documentation using the name of the  
35  
36 security assistance program or account, recipient country, year, and keywords from the item  
37  
38 description (when available). These searches provided a range of supplemental sources including  
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40 documents from the Africa Center for Security Studies, Congressional Research Service,  
41  
42 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, White House archives, and Washington Office on Latin  
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44 America. Online Appendix C contains a complete bibliography of sources referenced by the  
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46 Security Assistance Monitor in compiling their data and additional sources used by the research  
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48 team.  
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3 Some programs were simple to code. After reviewing the source documentation, we  
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5 determined, for example, that all of the aid provided in the Developing Country Combined  
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7 Exercise Program was *aid type* seven, joint exercises. However, the majority of security  
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9 assistance programs include hundreds of different activities. For these programs there are  
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11 typically significant amounts of aid with no description of the good or service provided. Other  
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13 observations have uninformative descriptions. Within the International Military Education and  
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15 Training (IMET) program, for instance, officer education, combat training, security sector  
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17 reform, and law enforcement assistance were all provided with the item description  
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19 “Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform”. For these observations, we had to refer  
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21 to multiple sources and code each country in each year separately. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan in  
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23 2015, IMET funded combat training, while IMET funds provided assistance to law enforcement  
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25 in El Salvador in 2018 (U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State 2015, 2019).  
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27 Both activities were described as “Stabilization Operations and Security Sector Reform”.  
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33 In order to minimize human error in recording aid type and recipient categories for each  
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35 observation, ensure consistent coding across observations, and simplify efforts to code additional  
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37 years of data in the future, the faculty PI and lead graduate research assistant used the manually  
38  
39 coded data to create a script to automate coding of the full dataset in Stata software (version 17).  
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41 Each line of code in the script, codes multiple observations by matching as few keywords as  
42  
43 possible to accurately identify the aid or recipient type within a particular program. The script for  
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45 coding all of the individual observations in the line item dataset will be released with the data,  
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47 providing complete transparency about coding decisions. In addition, researchers will be able to  
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49 modify the script to make different decisions about how to code observations. A researcher may,  
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51 for example, want to code the provision of weapons, ammunition, and weapons delivery  
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3 platforms/vehicles separately from the provision of military uniforms, facilities, and operational  
4 expenses. Although doing so is not a trivial undertaking, and not all item descriptions will allow  
5 for this distinction, modifying the script to accomplish this will be much more efficient than  
6 recoding each of the 7,550 observations currently coded as “material support” by hand.  
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### 15 ***Description of Datasets***

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17 There are two versions of the USASSA dataset. In the first version, each observation  
18 is an item (or items) of US security aid provided. Variables from the Security Assistance  
19 Monitor identify the country or geographic region that received the assistance, funding  
20 amount in US dollars, fiscal year in which the aid was disbursed, security assistance  
21 program under which the aid was authorized, an item description (when available), and a  
22 note indicating the original source of the data. To these variables, we added a standardized  
23 version of the country name based on the International Organization for Standardization  
24 (ISO)-3166-1 standard, numerical country codes from ISO-3166-1 and the Correlates of  
25 War project, the funding amount in constant 2010 US dollars, a variable identifying the  
26 managing agency (DoD, DoS, or joint), and our *aid type* and *recipient type* variables. There  
27 are 32,008 observations. 1,472 observations list a region (e.g., Central Asia or East Africa),  
28 rather than a specific country, as the aid recipient. In 1,114 observations, representing just  
29 over \$30 billion dollars (9%) of security assistance, the aid recipient is identified as  
30 “Global”. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the line item dataset.  
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52 [Table 2]  
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3 In the second version of the dataset, the unit of observation is the country-year. This  
4 dataset includes observations for all member states of the United Nations in every year from  
5 2000 to 2019. One variable records the total amount of security assistance a country  
6 received in a given year. Additional variables specify the amount of assistance the country  
7 received in each of the thirteen *aid type* categories, the amount of assistance provided to  
8 each *recipient type*, the amounts provided under Department of Defense and Department of  
9 State authorities, and the amount provided under each of the security assistance *programs* in  
10 operation between 2000 and 2019. To illustrate how data are aggregated from the line item  
11 to the country-year level of analysis, Appendix B shows a snapshot of the data for Niger in  
12 2014.  
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28 [Table 3]  
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31 Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the *aid type* and *recipient type* variables in the  
32 country-year dataset. The data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic reach of  
33 US security sector assistance, but also its diversity. The 192 countries in the dataset  
34 received an average of \$78.8 million in US security assistance a year from 2000 to 2019,  
35 with wide variation in the amount of aid provided across countries and across time.  
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37 Countries receiving the highest amounts of aid tended to receive most of this aid in the form  
38 of material support (weapons, vehicles, ammunition, supplies, and operational expenses)  
39 and military training. Security assistance provided to Afghanistan accounted for almost \$90  
40 billion (30%) of all US security assistance to specific countries over this time period. More  
41 than \$76 billion (63%) of this aid was provided as material support or military training.  
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43 Another \$4.7 billion was provided to support law enforcement and counternarcotics  
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3 operations. The US spent just over \$2 billion, 2.2% of total security aid to Afghanistan, on  
4 security sector institution-building.  
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8 In comparison to Afghanistan, Iraq received much smaller amounts of aid. The US  
9 provided about \$33 billion in total security aid, all but \$3 billion in the form of military  
10 training and material support, between 2000 and 2019. Other countries in the top 5% of  
11 security aid recipients include Colombia (up to \$1.4 billion/year in military training,  
12 material, and counternarcotics aid); Egypt (approximately \$1.3 billion/year in material aid);  
13 Israel (over \$2 billion/year in material and train and equip aid); and Pakistan (up to \$1.9  
14 billion/year in military training, material, and counternarcotics aid).  
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24 We create two additional variables to measure the amount of aid countries received  
25 in two composite categories likely to be of interest to researchers: *lethal aid* and *nonlethal*  
26 *aid*. The *lethal aid* variable measures the amount of assistance provided in the material  
27 support, military training, and train and equip aid categories. *Nonlethal aid* includes security  
28 sector reform, military education, humanitarian aid, counterproliferation programs, and aid  
29 categorized as “other/non-specified nonlethal assistance”.<sup>iv</sup> The distinction between lethal  
30 and nonlethal aid is imperfect. Within the *lethal aid* category, for example, the material  
31 support category includes weapons, ammunition, and tanks, but also includes the  
32 construction of military facilities and funding for uniforms and troop salaries. Our reasoning  
33 is that this category is meant to identify types of aid that are most likely to increase the  
34 capacity of the state to use deadly force and/or to make the use of force by state security  
35 forces more lethal. Nonlethal security assistance is not meant to increase the state’s capacity  
36 to use deadly force and it would be difficult for states to use it for this purpose. Scholars  
37 who wish to create their own composite categories can easily do so.  
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3 Figure 1 shows how the number of countries receiving aid, and the amounts of lethal  
4 aid and total security assistance provided change over time between 2000 and 2019. The  
5 data reveal several interesting patterns. The United States has provided some form of  
6 security assistance to at least 179 of the 193 United Nations member countries over the past  
7 twenty years. But the claim that the United States “trains and equips almost every military  
8 in the world” (Reveron 2016) is not entirely accurate. Between a third and two-thirds of  
9 countries receive some form of military training or equipment from the United States each  
10 year.  
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22 [Figure 1]

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24 Early in the War on Terror, the number of states receiving lethal aid from the United  
25 States actually declined, from 82 states in 2000 to just 66 states in 2002. After 2005, the  
26 number of states receiving military training and material support began to climb, reaching a  
27 peak of 139 states in 2007. In addition to the number of states receiving lethal aid, the  
28 average amount of lethal aid states received, and the ratio of lethal aid to total security  
29 assistance also sharply increased after 2005. Whereas lethal aid accounted for just 16% of  
30 the security assistance states received from 2000 to 2004, lethal aid averaged 66% percent  
31 of total aid between 2005 and 2019. In 2017, lethal aid made up 83% of security assistance;  
32 106 states received an average of 129 million dollars in material support and military  
33 training and just 5.3 million in all nonlethal categories of aid combined.  
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#### 48 **Comparison to other sources of data**

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50 Three other data sources provide access to some of the data provided by the USSASA dataset:  
51 the official government data provided at ForeignAssistance.gov, SIPRI’s Arms Transfer  
52 Database, and IMTAD-USA.  
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3 The closest match to the USASSA dataset is the data available at ForeignAssistance.gov  
4 (hereafter, FA.gov). At this site, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the  
5 Department of State provide public access to budgetary and financial information generated by  
6 U.S. government agencies managing foreign assistance portfolios. Data are provided on  
7 appropriations, obligations, and disbursements of funds for U.S. foreign assistance for fiscal  
8 years 2001 through 2023.<sup>v</sup> Funds are categorized as either economic or military assistance, as  
9 well as by multiple other categories according to standards developed by USAID and the  
10 Department of State, or as established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and  
11 Development (OECD). Information is also provided about the funding, managing, and  
12 implementing agency, funding account name, and “activity” funded.  
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26 In theory, these data could provide all the information provided by the Security  
27 Assistance Monitor about U.S. security assistance. In practice, there are significant limitations.  
28 Most critically, some funding amounts are missing from the FA.gov data; a significant amount of  
29 security assistance funding is categorized as economic, as opposed to military, aid; and  
30 information about the activity funded is redacted for approximately 33% of military assistance  
31 spending.  
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40 The tables in Appendix D compare the USASSA data to the data available from FA.gov  
41 by country, year, funding agency, US purpose/sector name, and account names. These tables  
42 help to illustrate inconsistencies in the FA.gov data. A study restricted to assistance classified by  
43 FA.gov as military assistance would omit almost \$109 billion in security assistance provided  
44 from 2001 to 2019. A significant amount of aid provided under U.S. security assistance  
45 authorizations is categorized as economic assistance. Although definitions for military and  
46 economic aid are provided, we have found it impossible to determine how these categories are  
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3 operationalized. While some security assistance classified as economic aid appears to fall into  
4  
5 our “humanitarian” and “nonlethal” aid categories, other funding is clearly of relevance to  
6  
7 researchers interested in the drivers and impacts of U.S. security assistance. This includes, for  
8  
9 example, billions in aid for counterterrorism, counternarcotics operations, and police training—  
10  
11 activities which sometimes appear in the economic aid category, and sometimes appear in the  
12  
13 military assistance bucket.  
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16  
17 It also appears some portion of the \$109 billion discrepancy between the USASSA and  
18  
19 FA.gov data is funding that is entirely missing from the FA.gov data. This funding is missing in  
20  
21 an inconsistent pattern and for reasons that are not transparent. One issue appears to be that some  
22  
23 programs and sources of funding are reported in some years, but not others. The Department of  
24  
25 Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is reported only for FY2017, the  
26  
27 amount is under \$23.4 million, and the recipient is recorded as “World”. The USASSA dataset  
28  
29 records total spending under the CTFP of \$413 million in 181 countries from 2003 through 2019.  
30  
31 For another Department of Defense program, the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, the  
32  
33 FA.gov data lists amounts spent in only 2015 and 2017. In addition to showing similar levels of  
34  
35 spending for this program in 2015 and 2017, the USASSA dataset reports disbursements from  
36  
37 the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund totaling over \$1.5 billion in 2016.  
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42  
43 Two final issues make the USASSA dataset preferable to the data at FA.gov. The data  
44  
45 provided on the site are provided to the Foreign Assistance Data and Reporting Team (FA-  
46  
47 DART) by the U.S. government agencies, departments, and offices that receive foreign  
48  
49 assistance funds or implement foreign assistance activities. The site notes that these data are  
50  
51 reported to FA-DART from over twenty different entities in various formats and reports, but,  
52  
53 unlike the data on the Security Assistance Monitor site and in USASSA, there is no bibliography  
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3 of publicly available sources a researcher could consult for further information. In addition,  
4 reporting agencies can redact data they believe “jeopardizes the priorities and interests of the  
5 U.S. government or the health and safety of its implementing partners”.<sup>vi</sup> A description of the  
6 activity funded is redacted for over \$74 billion in military aid, almost 33% of total military aid,  
7 between 2001 and 2019. The fact that the data available at FA.gov are submitted by over twenty  
8 different agencies, in formats and reports that change over time, may explain why there seem to  
9 be inconsistencies in how much is reported, and how it is categorized, from year to year.  
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19 The second data source with some overlap with the USASSA data is the Stockholm  
20 International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database (SIPRI 2022). SIPRI’s  
21 Arms Transfer Database is a comprehensive resource containing information on all major  
22 conventional weapons (MCW) transfers from 1950 to the most recent full calendar year. The  
23 major advantage of the SIPRI data is that it includes all MCW transfers from all suppliers, not  
24 just the United States. However, two significant limitations make the dataset less appropriate for  
25 researchers interested in U.S. security assistance. The first is that the dataset does not include any  
26 information about forms of assistance other than major conventional weapons transfers, such as  
27 small arms and light weapons, military training, logistical support, or funds provided for foreign  
28 military operational expenses. The second is that the dataset does not distinguish between  
29 weapons purchased by the recipient government and weapons provided as aid.<sup>vii</sup> Researchers  
30 interested in both arms transfers funded by security assistance and U.S. arms sales to foreign  
31 countries may find the Security Assistance Monitor’s Arms Sales Database more useful as it  
32 provides data on sales of a wider range of defense articles and services by the U.S. government  
33 and American commercial vendors and the data can easily be merged with the USASSA dataset  
34 (Center for International Policy 2023).  
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3 The recently released International Military Training Activities Database-USA (IMTAD-  
4 USA) is the final source of data partially overlapping with the USASSA data (McLauchlin,  
5 Seymour, and Martel 2022). This dataset provides detailed data on all foreign military training  
6 provided by the United States from 1999 to 2016 based on the annual *Foreign Military Training*  
7 *Report* produced by the Departments of State and Defense and supplemented with additional  
8 government documents and secondary sources. Variables in the dataset include training location,  
9 program objectives, characteristics of the forces trained, the number of trainees, and training  
10 costs. This dataset provides more detailed information on military training programs than the  
11 USASSA data, particularly in regards to training location and the number of trainees in a  
12 program-country-year. IMTAD-USA is also particularly notable for its coverage of classified  
13 training activities. Additionally, information on training objectives for the 34 training programs  
14 coded by the researchers is likely to be useful for some purposes, although these variables do not  
15 vary across countries or years. The key difference between the IMTAD-USA and USASSA  
16 datasets is that IMTAD-USA only includes data on military training and materials provided as a  
17 component of training while USASSA includes all forms of security assistance.  
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### 41 **Potential uses of the USASSA data**

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43 Over the last several decades, a voluminous literature has developed around the  
44 effectiveness and unintended consequences of development aid, but scholars have only recently  
45 begun to investigate the impacts of foreign military aid. Fortunately, academic interest in  
46 security assistance has risen sharply over the past ten years. Recent studies have investigated  
47 whether security sector aid buys influence over recipients' foreign policy behavior (Berg 2022;  
48 Martinez Machain 2021; Sullivan, Tessman, and Li 2011); the relationship between military aid  
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3 and civilian targeting during armed conflict (Darden 2019; Jadoon 2018); the impact of US  
4 security assistance on state repression (Dube and Naidu 2015; Martinez Machain 2023;  
5 Omelicheva, Carter, and Campbell 2017; Sandholtz 2016; Sullivan, Blanken, and Rice 2020);  
6 and the relationship between US military training and coup risk in recipient countries (Savage  
7 and Caverley 2017). The expansion of US security assistance as a counterterrorism tool has also  
8 prompted a flurry of increasingly sophisticated investigations into the effects of US military aid  
9 on terrorism (Bapat 2011; Boutton 2019; Danzell, Kisangani, and Pickering 2019; Kim, Li, and  
10 Sandler 2019; Neumayer and Plümper 2011).

11  
12 Most studies, however, focus on a narrow subset of security assistance (e.g., training at  
13 the School of the Americas or the International Military Education and Training (IMET)  
14 program), or treat all military aid as equivalent—even though some security assistance is closer  
15 in character to what both scholars and policymakers have traditionally defined as humanitarian  
16 aid, while other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and proxy warfare. Lump  
17 sum and dichotomous aid/no aid approaches do not account for the possibility that particular  
18 kinds of military aid, or aid to different types of recipients (e.g., law enforcement versus military  
19 forces), have distinct impacts. Nor can we explore whether different factors drive the provision  
20 of various types of aid.

21  
22 Preliminary evidence from a handful of studies that have attempted to disaggregate  
23 security aid types suggests that these distinctions matter. One example is provided in the  
24 literature on the association between military training and coup risk in recipient countries. In a  
25 widely-cited study based on data on the number of foreign military officers trained under two  
26 programs—International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the Combating Terrorism  
27 Fellowship Program—Savage and Caverley (2017) conclude that American foreign military

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3 training sharply increases the probability of a military coup attempt in the recipient country  
4  
5 (543). However, when McLaughlin, Seymour, and Martel (2022) are able to conduct a broader  
6  
7 analysis with data on all US security assistance programs that fund military training, they find  
8  
9 that only training provided under the IMET program (which accounts for just 30% of  
10  
11 expenditures and 13% of trainees worldwide) is associated with higher coup risk. Another  
12  
13 example is provided in a study by Omelicheva, Carter, and Campbell (2017) who explore the  
14  
15 effects of security assistance on civilian targeting by state security forces during intrastate  
16  
17 conflicts. They, too, disaggregate US military aid by program. The results are complex. The total  
18  
19 amount of US security assistance is negatively correlated with civilian deaths. However, some  
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21 individual programs, including Foreign Military Sales and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship  
22  
23 Program, are associated with increases in atrocities.  
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29 Although these studies provide important insights, they tell us little about why security  
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31 assistance programs have disparate effects. Could variation in outcomes be due to differences in  
32  
33 the types of aid provided across programs, or the security sector actors that are the primary  
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35 recipients of aid from different programs? To demonstrate the utility of the new data, we provide  
36  
37 a preliminary analysis of how US security assistance affects human rights violations by state  
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39 security forces and domestic terrorism, with particular attention to whether the effects of security  
40  
41 aid vary across types of aid. Our methodology attempts to address the strong likelihood that aid  
42  
43 allocations are endogenous to these outcomes, and that there a number of potential confounders  
44  
45 that could lead to spurious correlations. Nevertheless, we cannot make any claims about  
46  
47 causality in these models. Our main purpose here is to highlight potentially important  
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49 relationships between types of US security assistance and salient measures of security in  
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3 recipient states. We hope that these preliminary results inspire additional, more sophisticated and  
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5 robust explorations of these relationships by scholars.  
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### 8 9 **Security Assistance and Population Security**

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11 For this analysis, we use the country-year dataset with one observation for each UN  
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13 member state from 2000 to 2019. We exclude Afghanistan and Iraq from the primary analyses  
14  
15 because they are outliers in terms of the extraordinary amount of U.S. aid provided and the  
16  
17 sustained U.S. military engagement in these countries throughout the period under investigation.  
18  
19 Results from estimating models including these countries do not vary in any substantively  
20  
21 meaningful way from the results we report below.  
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#### 27 *Key independent variables*

28  
29 To create the independent variables we use in the analyses, we generate five-year moving  
30  
31 averages of the amount of aid provided as *lethal* aid and the amount of aid provided as *nonlethal*  
32  
33 aid and then apply the natural log transformation to these averages. To create the measure of  
34  
35 lethal aid a country received, for example, we take the natural log of the average amount of  
36  
37 security assistance the country received as military training, material support, and comprehensive  
38  
39 Train and Equip aid over the prior five years. Nonlethal security assistance includes aid for  
40  
41 security sector education, security sector reform, humanitarian projects, and counterproliferation  
42  
43 programs. Security assistance provided for logistical support, joint military exercises, law  
44  
45 enforcement, and counternarcotics, as well as unknown or unclear purposes, is excluded from  
46  
47 this analysis.  
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53 Using a lagged measure of average aid over a five-year period partially addresses  
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55 concerns about reverse causality as the aid allocation decisions will have been made at least one,  
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3 and up to seven years prior to measurement of the security outcomes. In addition, security  
4  
5 assistance is an investment over time that is likely to take several years to have an effect on  
6  
7 levels of domestic terrorism or human rights conditions in recipient countries. Five years is a  
8  
9 reasonable amount of time to expect investments in military training, material support, security  
10  
11 sector reform, or education to have an impact on our population security outcome measures.  
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### 16 *Dependent variables*

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18 Our first three models estimate the effects of *lethal* and *nonlethal* US security assistance  
19  
20 on human rights conditions in the recipient country. To create the dependent variables for  
21  
22 Models 1 and 2, we use the Freedom of Assembly and Association variable and the Physical  
23  
24 Integrity Rights Index from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset  
25  
26 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010)—updated through 2020 by the CIRIGHTS Data Project (Mark  
27  
28 et al. 2023). The Freedom of Assembly and Association variable is a score ranging from zero  
29  
30 (citizens' rights to freedom of assembly or association severely restricted) to two (rights to  
31  
32 freedom of assembly and association virtually unrestricted). The Physical Integrity Rights Index  
33  
34 is an additive index constructed from the dataset's measures of torture, extrajudicial killing,  
35  
36 political imprisonment, and forced disappearance. It ranges from 0 (no government respect for  
37  
38 these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights) (Cingranelli and Richards  
39  
40 1999). The dependent variable in Model 3 is calculated from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney,  
41  
42 Cornett, and Wood 2009). Countries are coded annually based on the prevalence of political  
43  
44 imprisonment, torture, extrajudicial killings, and other types of political violence by states  
45  
46 against their citizens as documented in Amnesty International Reports. Countries coded 1 are  
47  
48 considered to be under secure rule of law. Each successive level represents a higher prevalence  
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3 of physical integrity violations by state agents. The most highly repressive regimes are coded 5  
4  
5 (Gibney et al. 2022).  
6

7  
8 Models 4 and 5 estimate the effects of *lethal* and *nonlethal* US security assistance on  
9  
10 levels of political violence in the recipient country. To construct these dependent variables, we  
11  
12 use counts of the number of terrorist attacks (Model 4) and the number of terrorism-related  
13  
14 fatalities (Model 5) in the country from the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium for  
15  
16 the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 2022). We take the natural log of the terrorist  
17  
18 attacks and fatalities variables to correct for distributions with long right tails.  
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21

### 22 *Confounding factors*

23  
24 Each model includes lagged measures of the dependent variable at  $t-5$  and  $t-6$  to partially  
25  
26 account for the endogeneity of aid amounts and the fact that our outcome measures are likely to  
27  
28 be correlated across time within countries. We expect, for example, that levels of terrorism in a  
29  
30 country in 2004 and 2005 are likely to affect the amount and type of security assistance a country  
31  
32 receives in the 2005 to 2009 period, and that the number of terrorist incidents and fatalities a  
33  
34 country experiences in 2010 will be related to the prevalence of terrorism prior to this period. In  
35  
36 robustness checks, we test models with different lag structures and find consistent results.  
37  
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40  
41 In addition to lagged values of the dependent variables, we include several control  
42  
43 variables to isolate the impact of U.S. security assistance. Each of these variables may impact the  
44  
45 amount and type of security assistance a country receives and security outcomes in the state. We  
46  
47 control for each country's level of globalization (Gygli et al. 2019), population and GDP per  
48  
49 capita (World Bank 2019) because the US may have more economic and strategic interests in  
50  
51 larger, more globalized countries, while wealthier countries may be less likely to receive military  
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53 training and weapons as aid because they can afford to purchase these goods and services. To  
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3 more directly account for US strategic interests we also include a dummy variable indicating a  
4 country has a formal alliance with the U.S. (Leeds et al. 2002) and the natural log of U.S. troops  
5 stationed in the country (Allen, Flynn, and Martinez Machain 2022). We control for armed  
6 conflict onset in the past three years with data from UCDP/PRIO (Pettersson et al. 2021), as this  
7 may drive an increase in security aid and a deterioration in security conditions in a state. Two  
8 proxies for initial conditions in potential aid recipients—state fragility (Marshall and Elzinga-  
9 Marshall 2017) and whether the country was a stable democracy (Marshall and Gurr 2020)—are  
10 measured at  $t-5$ . These conditions may affect aid amounts and types as well as prospects for  
11 improvement or deterioration in security outcomes in recipient states. Finally, all models contain  
12 year fixed effects to account for changes over time that affect all potential aid recipients.  
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## 28 **Results**

29  
30 Each column in Table 4 reports results from estimation of a GLS regression model with year  
31 fixed effects and random effects at the country level. Standard errors are clustered by country.  
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35 [Table 4]

36  
37 Coefficients on the control variables in the models are largely consistent with what is  
38 known about the correlates of state repression and political violence. Respect for freedom of  
39 assembly and association and for physical integrity rights are generally higher in stable  
40 democracies and in countries that are more integrated into global economic and political systems.  
41  
42 Formal allies of the United States also appear to have better human rights conditions on average.  
43  
44 Physical integrity violations tend to be higher in states with larger populations and increase with  
45 the onset of armed conflict. The onset of armed conflict in a country also significantly increases  
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47 the number of terrorist attacks and deaths from terrorist attacks. Terrorism is more likely to  
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3 increase over time in fragile states and in countries with large populations. All else equal, levels  
4  
5 of terrorism are lower in countries that have a formal alliance with the United States. However,  
6  
7 none of the security outcomes appear to be affected by the number of US troops stationed in a  
8  
9 country after accounting for the other variables in the models.  
10  
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12 Moving to the effects of security assistance, the results suggest that only *lethal aid* –  
13  
14 military training and material support to recipient state security forces—has a statistically  
15  
16 significant effect on our outcome measures, even though the median amount of nonlethal aid is  
17  
18 higher than the median amount of lethal aid states receive. To better understand the substantive  
19  
20 effects of military training and material support, Table 5 reports the predicted value of each of  
21  
22 our outcome variables as the amount of lethal aid a state has received over the past five years  
23  
24 varies from zero, to the median and maximum amounts observed in our sample (excluding Iraq  
25  
26 and Afghanistan). To calculate these predicted values, all other variables are set to their median  
27  
28 values, including the lagged values of the dependent variable in each model. The values of these  
29  
30 variables at  $t-5$  and  $t-6$  are shown in column 2. Columns 3 through 5 display the predicted value  
31  
32 of the dependent variable after receiving no lethal aid, the median amount of lethal aid  
33  
34 (approximately \$27,500 in military training and/or material support), or the maximum amount of  
35  
36 lethal aid over the past five years (almost \$9.4 billion).  
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42 [Table 5]  
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45 All else equal, countries that receive the maximum amount of lethal aid over five years  
46  
47 are predicted to score 24% lower on CIRI's Freedom of Association and Assembly index, and  
48  
49 22% lower on the Physical Integrity Rights index, than countries that do not receive any security  
50  
51 assistance for military training and materials from the United States. A state with median values  
52  
53 on all of the control variables in the model can expect their score on the Physical Integrity Rights  
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3 index to drop from 5 at  $t-5$  to 4.5 at  $t$  if they receive the median amount of lethal aid for five  
4  
5 years. The pattern is similar when the dependent variable is the Political Terror Scale (PTS). A  
6  
7 state's score on the five-point PTS is expected to be more than half a point higher for states that  
8  
9 receive the maximum amount of lethal aid, than for states that do not receive any lethal security  
10  
11 assistance.  
12  
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14  
15 Turning to the relationship between U.S. security assistance and terrorism, we again see  
16  
17 that only the amount of lethal aid countries receive has a statistically significant effect. If the  
18  
19 amount of security assistance provided as military training and material support over a five-year  
20  
21 period increases from the median in our sample to the maximum, the predicted number of  
22  
23 terrorist attacks increases from 1.6 to 2.2. Increasing the amount of lethal aid a country receives  
24  
25 over five years from the minimum to the maximum increases fatalities from terrorist attacks by  
26  
27 164%.  
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30  
31 Each of these relationships deserves further investigation. There is no doubt that security  
32  
33 assistance is endogenous to security conditions in recipient states, so we cannot conclude from  
34  
35 this exploratory analysis that lethal aid is causing increases in state repression or fueling  
36  
37 terrorism. We take several steps to address concerns about reverse causality and confounding  
38  
39 factors, including directly accounting for the effects of past values of the dependent variable, but  
40  
41 more sophisticated statistical modeling could provide more confidence about the causal impact  
42  
43 of lethal aid. Process tracing in case studies could also contribute to greater understanding of the  
44  
45 effects of military training and material support on human rights conditions and political  
46  
47 violence. Moreover, there is much more work to be done to explore the effects of particular types  
48  
49 of aid. Does assistance for security sector reform, counternarcotics, or law enforcement have its  
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51 intended effects in recipient countries? Are there unintended consequences from providing these  
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3 types of aid? We hope this dataset will provide scholars with the data they need to explore a wide  
4  
5 range of important questions about the determinants and effects of particular forms of security  
6  
7 assistance to a variety of security sector actors.  
8  
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## 11 **Conclusion**

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14 Despite the significant sums committed to foreign security assistance, and an increasing  
15  
16 reliance on this tool to counter a wide range of perceived threats to national interests, we know  
17  
18 much less about this foreign policy instrument than either economic aid or direct military  
19  
20 intervention. This project is an attempt to provide researchers, policymakers, and the public with  
21  
22 as full as possible an accounting of unclassified US security sector aid spending across the globe,  
23  
24 and to delve into the specifics of what goods and services are being provided to which security  
25  
26 sector actors with these funds. Our data clearly show not only the magnitude and geographic  
27  
28 reach of US security sector assistance, but also its diversity. While some US security assistance  
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30 is more akin to humanitarian aid, other types of assistance blur the line between foreign aid and  
31  
32 proxy warfare.  
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38 Why is comprehensive, detailed data on US security assistance so important? Extant  
39  
40 studies of security assistance typically rely on aggregate amounts of military aid, or focus on aid  
41  
42 provided by a specific program. These approaches cannot account for the possibility that  
43  
44 particular kinds of military aid, or aid to different types of recipients, have distinct effects.  
45  
46 Although the security sector assistance included in this dataset is all provided by one donor, it is  
47  
48 likely to have significant substantive impacts on governance, stability, political violence,  
49  
50 interstate conflict, and a range of other phenomena of interest worldwide due to the magnitude  
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52 and reach of this aid. The United States provides significantly more security assistance to many  
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3 more countries than any other state. Up to 93% of countries receive some level of security  
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5 assistance from the US. And scholars estimate that total US security aid worldwide is far greater  
6  
7 than the aid provided by China, the UK, France, and Russia combined, although reliable data on  
8  
9 security assistance provided by other states is much more difficult to obtain (Carrozza and Marsh  
10  
11 2022). Moreover, a large number of low and middle-income countries, as well as fragile and  
12  
13 conflict-affected states, receive very high amounts of US security aid relative to government  
14  
15 revenue, and relative to the amount of international aid they receive for development. In some  
16  
17 years, a handful of low and middle-income countries received more security assistance from the  
18  
19 United States than Official Development Assistance from all OECD donor countries combined.  
20  
21 Examples include Pakistan, Colombia, Egypt and Peru. And, unlike other forms of aid, security  
22  
23 assistance is disproportionately channeled to one of the most powerful institutions in many  
24  
25 nondemocratic countries—the military.  
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31 As we enter a new era of great power competition, it becomes increasingly critical to  
32  
33 understand how this foreign policy tool is employed and its effects. Advances in understanding  
34  
35 the utility, risks, and limitations of this policy tool require a comprehensive source for detailed  
36  
37 data on the amounts of various types of security assistance provided and the recipients of that  
38  
39 assistance over time. We see these data contributing to advances in research in three broad  
40  
41 categories: (1) security aid impacts in recipient countries and regions; (2) the effects of security  
42  
43 assistance on US national security and international relations; and, (3) the determinants of  
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45 variation in the magnitude, modalities, and recipients of security sector assistance. Examples of  
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47 questions that could be explored include:  
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51 • Are some forms of security assistance more effective at building partner capacity than  
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53 others?  
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- How do political, strategic, and economic factors explain differences in the portfolio of security aid of various types that a country receives?
- Can aid for institutional capacity building improve respect for human rights?
- Is the risk of civilian harm greater when lethal aid is provided to certain kinds of security forces?
- How do different types of security aid impact civil-military relations in recipient states?
- How do the amounts and types of security assistance the US provides, and the distribution of this aid across countries, change with shifts in national security priorities?

We hope the availability of these data will spur more advanced research on security assistance as a foreign policy tool just as better data on alliances, sanctions, and the use of military force have advanced our understanding of those policy instruments.

### **Data availability statement**

Data for this article are available on the lead author's website and online at... The project team is working to expand the number of years covered by the dataset, disaggregate the material support category, and leverage AI and machine learning capabilities to enhance data collection and coding. An updated version of the dataset should be released in 2025.

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**Table 1. Security Sector Aid Typology**

Material support	weapons; ammunition; military equipment, gear, and supplies; vehicles (e.g., aircraft, tanks, trucks); military facilities construction; funding provided to recipient for operational expenses
Military training	Training in combat skills, military tactics, use-of-force operations, and related skills (military pilot training, counterinsurgency/counterterrorism tactics and operations). Includes training for police and other internal security forces when military tactics or the use of military weapons are taught
Train and Equip (T&E)	Comprehensive efforts to build or rebuild a military unit, government security force, or government-affiliated militia. Must include military training or advising and material support
Security Sector education	Non-combat courses for officers (e.g., national security strategy, leadership); human rights, humanitarian law, democracy, civil-military relations, military professionalism, and rule-of-law training; language courses
Transportation/logistical support	Direct provision of transportation, technical, or logistical services by US military personnel or contractors.
Joint exercises	Military exercises conducted by US armed forces with foreign forces
Security sector reform (SSR)	Defense-related institution-building; strengthening civilian control of the military and other security forces; anti-corruption and accountability initiatives; legal capacity institution building
Law enforcement	Provision of services or equipment to police; training in civilian policing; criminal investigation; border/port security advising/education; coast guard/maritime officer courses; search and rescue training; monitoring drug, weapons, or illicit finance trafficking ( <u>Excludes</u> training in kinetic counterterrorism, counterinsurgency or counternarcotics tactics and operations)
Counternarcotics	Counterdrug trafficking operations; eradication; trafficking and supply interdiction; training in forceful counternarcotics tactics and operations
Humanitarian aid	Development aid, disaster assistance, humanitarian aid; demining operations; disarmament; weapons destruction; demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants
Counterproliferation	Funding to secure, disrupt, interdict, or prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, delivery systems, sensitive non-WMD technologies, and illicit transfers of conventional weapons; building export control, regulatory, and border security capabilities; enforcement cooperation with customs, border guards, and port control authorities
Other nonlethal	Other <u>nonlethal</u> assistance that cannot be categorized as counterproliferation, humanitarian aid, law enforcement, education, or security sector reform
Unclear	aid type cannot be determined

**Table 2. Line item dataset descriptive statistics**

Variable	Obs	Unique	Mean	Min	Max	Label
country	32008	257				Country or region
ccode	29422	189	481	6	990	COW ccode
ccode_iso	29603	200	459	4	6881	ISO 3166 numeric
year	32008	20	2010	2000	2019	year
program_num	32008	60		1	65	SA Program numbered
amount	32008	13467	10.7	-1,250.0	10,600.0	amount of security aid
amount_real	32008	21220	10.6	-1,480.0	10,300.0	amount in constant 2010 \$
aidtype	32008	14	6	1	14	aid type
recipienttype	32008	8	7	1	8	recipient type
item	23444	6914				item description
region	29151	22		1	22	UN region code
provider	31879	3	1	1	3	Managing agency


Note: Security assistance amounts are displayed in millions of US dollars.

**Table 3. Country-year dataset descriptive statistics**

	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean USD</b>	<b>SD</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Sum</b>
<b>Aid types</b>	Total security assistance	78.8	510.0	0	11,000.0	300,000.0
	Material support	19.6	170.0	0	3,800.0	74,000.0
	Military training	1.7	18.0	0	430.0	6,400.0
	Train and Equip (T&E)	26.2	360.0	0	11,000.0	98,000.0
	Security sector education	.9	14.0	0	830.0	3,300.0
	Logistical support	1.3	30.0	0	1,400.0	5,000.0
	Joint military exercises	.3	6.0	0	210.0	1,200.0
	Security sector reform	1.7	16.0	0	570.0	6,200.0
	Law enforcement	1.5	22.0	0	850.0	5,800.0
	Counternarcotics	2.3	24.0	0	930.0	8,500.0
	Humanitarian aid	1.1	7.0	0	160.0	4,000.0
	Counterproliferation	1.4	16.0	0	380.0	5,300.0
	Other nonlethal aid	.2	5.7	0	330.0	910.0
	Unclear/unknown	21.1	190.0	0	3,100.0	79,000.0
<b>Recipient types</b>	Ground forces	10.4	170.0	0	5,500.0	39,000.0
	Air forces	3.1	54.0	0	1,900.0	12,000.0
	Naval forces	1.8	42.0	0	1,300.0	6,800.0
	Police	3.6	50.0	0	1,400.0	13,000.0
	Specialized forces	.2	8.4	0	510.0	850.0
	Civilians	1.6	14.0	0	420.0	5,900.0
	Multiple security force types	28.1	360.0	0	11,000.0	110,000.0
	Recipient unclear/unknown	29.9	220.0	0	3,800.0	110,000.0

Note: Amounts in millions of US dollars. The unit of observation is the recipient country-year (e.g., Iraq 2009). There are 3,748 observations for each variable. The sum column displays the total amount provided for each aid or recipient type over the twenty year period between 2000 and 2019.

Figure 1. Number of countries receiving aid and amounts of aid 2000-2019



view

**Table 4. Security Aid and Population Security**

	<b>Model 1</b> Association & Assembly Rights	<b>Model 2</b> Physical Integrity Rights	<b>Model 3</b> Political Terror	<b>Model 4</b> Terrorist Attacks	<b>Model 5</b> Killed in Terrorist Attacks
Lethal Aid past 5 years ( <i>ln</i> )	-0.011** (0.00)	-0.051** (0.01)	0.027** (0.01)	0.025** (0.01)	0.046** (0.01)
Nonlethal Aid past 5 years ( <i>ln</i> )	-0.001 (0.01)	0.009 (0.02)	0.000 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.02)
Consolidated Democracy ( <i>t-5</i> )	0.324** (0.06)	0.311* (0.14)	-0.112 (0.11)	0.127 (0.11)	0.086 (0.14)
State Fragility ( <i>t-5</i> )	-0.001 (0.01)	-0.012 (0.02)	0.028* (0.01)	0.032+ (0.02)	0.064** (0.02)
GDP per capita ( <i>ln</i> )	-0.049 (0.03)	-0.059 (0.10)	0.064 (0.05)	0.116 (0.07)	0.150+ (0.09)
Population ( <i>ln</i> )	-0.073** (0.02)	-0.491** (0.05)	0.206** (0.03)	0.248** (0.04)	0.316** (0.04)
Globalization index	0.007* (0.00)	0.038** (0.01)	-0.019** (0.01)	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.009 (0.01)
US Ally	0.131* (0.05)	0.364** (0.13)	-0.154+ (0.08)	-0.259* (0.11)	-0.335* (0.15)
US troops in country ( <i>ln</i> )	-0.003 (0.01)	0.029 (0.03)	0.005 (0.02)	0.012 (0.02)	0.003 (0.02)
Conflict onset (past 3 years)	0.011 (0.04)	-0.199* (0.09)	0.145* (0.06)	0.354** (0.07)	0.487** (0.09)
Constant	1.687** (0.40)	9.362** (1.22)	-1.177+ (0.67)	-5.168** (0.91)	-6.335** (1.15)
<i>N</i> (country-years)	2361	2360	1756	2347	2347
<i>chi2</i>	2206	1477	696	1034	449

Note: GLS regression models with year fixed effects and country random effects. All models contain lagged values of the dependent variable at *t-5* and *t-6* (not shown). Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on the country. Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded from the analysis.

\*\*  $p < .01$  \*  $p < .05$  +  $p < .1$

**Table 5.** Predicted Value of Outcome Variables as Levels of *Lethal Aid* vary

Outcome Variable (DV)	DV at <i>t-5</i> and <i>t-6</i> (median)	Levels of <i>Lethal Aid</i>			% change minimum to maximum lethal aid
		No lethal aid over past five years	Median amount of lethal aid for five years	Maximum amount of lethal aid for five years	
<b>Freedom of Association and Assembly</b>	1	.99	.89	.75	-24%
<b>Respect for Physical Integrity Rights</b>	5	4.9	4.5	3.8	-22%
<b>Political Terror Scale</b>	3	2.40	2.60	2.94	+23%
<b>Number of terrorist attacks</b>	0	1.3	1.6	2.2	+69%
<b>Number of fatalities in terrorist attacks</b>	0	1.1	1.6	2.9	+164%

## Appendix A . U.S. Security Sector Assistance Codebook

Variable	Label
country	recipient country or region
-----	
type: string (str44)	
unique values: 257	missing: 0/32,008
examples: "Colombia"	
"Indonesia"	
"Moldova"	
"Global"	
"Western Hemisphere Regional"	
-----	
ccode	COW ccode
-----	
type: numeric (int)	
range: [6, 990]	units: 1
unique values: 189	missing : 2,586/32,008
-----	
ccode_iso	ISO 3166 numeric
-----	
type: numeric (int)	
range: [4, 6881]	units: 1
unique values: 200	missing : 2,405/32,008
-----	
year	year aid delivered
-----	
type: numeric (int)	
range: [2000, 2019]	units: 1
unique values: 20	missing : 0/32,008
-----	
program_num	SA Program numbered
-----	
type: numeric (byte)	
range: [1, 65]	units: 1
unique values: 60	missing : 0/32,008



- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4 [1] Afghanistan Security Forces Fund
- 5
- 6 [2] Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia
- 7
- 8 [3] Aviation Leadership Program
- 9
- 10 [4] Coalition Support Funds
- 11
- 12 [5] Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
- 13
- 14 [6] Cooperative Threat Reduction
- 15
- 16 [7] Counter-Islamic State in Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund
- 17
- 18 [8] Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund
- 19
- 20 [9] Defense Institute of International Legal Studies
- 21
- 22 [10] Defense Institution Reform Initiative
- 23
- 24 [11] Department of Homeland Security - U.S. Coast Guard Activities
- 25
- 26 [12] Developing Country Combined Exercise Program
- 27
- 28 [13] Emergency Drawdowns
- 29
- 30 [14] European Deterrence Initiative
- 31
- 32 [15] European Reassurance Initiative
- 33
- 34 [16] Excess Defense Articles
- 35
- 36 [17] Foreign Military Financing
- 37
- 38 [18] Freedom Support Act Security Assistance
- 39
- 40 [19] Global Lift and Sustain
- 41
- 42 [20] Global Security Contingency Fund
- 43
- 44 [21] Global Security Contingency Fund (DOD)
- 45
- 46 [22] Global Security Contingency Fund (DOS)
- 47
- 48 [23] International Counterproliferation Programs
- 49
- 50 [24] International Military Education and Training
- 51
- 52 [25] International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
- 53
- 54 [26] Iraq Security Forces Fund
- 55
- 56 [27] Iraq Train and Equip Fund
- 57
- 58 [28] Israel Cooperative Programs
- 59
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- 1
- 2
- 3 [29] Misc Dept of State & Dept of Defense Non-Security Assistance
- 4
- 5 [30] Non-Security Assistance - Unified Command
- 6
- 7 [31] Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs
- 8
- 9 [32] Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
- 10
- 11 [33] Peacekeeping Operations
- 12
- 13 [34] Regional Centers for Security Studies
- 14
- 15 [35] Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance
- 16
- 17 [36] Section 1033 Counter-Drug Assistance
- 18
- 19 [37] Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority
- 20
- 21 [38] Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance
- 22
- 23 [39] Section 333 Building Partner Capacity
- 24
- 25 [40] Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative
- 26
- 27 [41] State Partnership Program
- 28
- 29 [42] Syria Train and Equip Fund
- 30
- 31 [43] Wales Initiative
- 32
- 33 [45] African Partnership Flight/Station
- 34
- 35 [46] Continuing Promise
- 36
- 37 [47] Enhanced Intl Peacekeeping Capacity
- 38
- 39 [48] Exchange Training
- 40
- 41 [50] PME Exchange
- 42
- 43 [51] Service Academies
- 44
- 45 [53] Ukraine Security Assistance
- 46
- 47 [54] Inter-American Air Forces Academy
- 48
- 49 [55] Inter-European Air Forces Academy
- 50
- 51 [56] International Criminal Investigations
- 52
- 53 [58] Military to Military Engagements
- 54
- 55 [59] Ministry of Defense Advisors Program
- 56
- 57 [60] Partnership Stations
- 58
- 59 [61] Section 1208
- 60

[62] Security Cooperation Programs

[64] Western Hemisphere Institute

[65] Training w Friendly Foreign Countries

---

amount amount of security assistance in USD

---

type: numeric (double)

range: [-1.247e+09, 1.062e+10] units: 1  
unique values: 13,467 missing : 0/32,008

mean: 1.1e+07  
std. dev: 1.5e+08

percentiles: 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%  
2500 25028 223888 1.2e+06 7.5e+06

---

aidtype aid type

---

type: numeric (byte)  
label: aidtype

range: [1,14] units: 1  
unique values: 14 missing : 0/32,008

- [1] **Material** support – all weapons; ammunition; military equipment, gear, and supplies; vehicles (e.g., aircraft, tanks, trucks); financing to purchase weapons and equipment; construction of military facilities (capital projects, infrastructure); funding for salaries, stipends, or other operational expenses; reimbursement for operational expenses
- [2] Military **training** – Training and/or advising in combat skills, military tactics, kinetic<sup>1</sup>/armed/use-of-force operations, and related skills (including military pilot training, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics and operations). Includes training for police and other internal security forces when combat skills, military tactics, armed counterinsurgency or counterterrorism tactics/operations, or the use of military weapons are taught.
- [3] ~~Combat **assist** – U.S. troops supporting or accompanying indigenous security forces in military operations; providing air support or long-range firepower~~ [category removed]
- [4] Train and Equip (**train\_equip**) – comprehensive efforts to build or rebuild the military capacity of a military service, unit, government security force, or government-affiliated militia. Must include provision of both combat training and material support to the same security force or unit.

---

<sup>1</sup> “Kinetic” capabilities are designed to produce effects using physical force, including physical damage to, or destruction of, targets.

- 1  
2  
3 [5] Military/Security Sector **education** -- non-combat courses for officers (e.g., national security  
4 strategy, leadership); human rights, humanitarian law, democracy, civil-military relations,  
5 military professionalism, and rule-of-law training; language courses  
6  
7 [6] Transportation/**logistical**/technical support - direct provision of services by US military  
8 personnel or contractors  
9  
10 [7] Joint **exercises** – military exercises conducted by US armed forces with foreign forces  
11  
12 [8] Security sector reform (**SSR**) – defense-related institution building; strengthening civilian  
13 control of the military and other security forces; anti-corruption and accountability  
14 initiatives; rule of law institution-building  
15  
16 [9] Law enforcement (**policing**) -- provision of services or equipment to police; training in  
17 civilian policing and provision of security by police forces; criminal investigation; border/port  
18 security advising/education; coast guard/maritime officer courses; search and rescue  
19 training; counterterrorism financing; anti-money laundering; monitoring drug, weapons, or  
20 illicit finance trafficking (Excludes training in kinetic counterterrorism/counterinsurgency or  
21 counternarcotics tactics and operations. These should be coded as military training or  
22 counternarcotics)  
23  
24 [10] **Counternarcotics** tactics and operations; eradication; interdiction; training in forceful  
25 counternarcotics tactics and operations  
26  
27 [11] **Humanitarian** aid -- development aid, disaster assistance, humanitarian aid; demining  
28 operations; disarmament; weapons destruction; demobilization and reintegration of ex-  
29 combatants  
30  
31 [12] **Counterproliferation** – funding to secure, disrupt, interdict, or prevent the spread of  
32 weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, or biological), delivery systems, sensitive  
33 non-WMD technologies, and illicit transfers of conventional weapons; includes building  
34 related export control, regulatory, and border security capabilities; enforcement  
35 cooperation with customs, border guards, and port control authorities  
36  
37 [13] Other/non-specified **nonlethal** assistance – aid is nonlethal and does not meet the  
38 definition for any other category  
39  
40 [14] **Unclear** – aid type cannot be determined

41 -----  
42 recipienttype

recipient type  
43 -----

44 type: numeric (byte)

45 range: [1,8]

46 unique values: 8

units: 1

missing :: 0/32,008

47  
48 [1] Army/**ground** forces

49 [2] **Air** forces

50 [3] **Naval**/Riverine forces

51 [4] **Police**/ Law enforcement

52 [5] **Special forces**/elite/internal security units (not under authority of police or regular armed  
53 forces)

54 [6] **Civilians**/government (including general population, government ministers, and civil  
55 servants)  
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[7] **Unspecified** security forces or individuals from multiple branches of security forces  
 [8] **unknown** – insufficient information to determine

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item item provided

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type: string (str900)  
 unique values: 6,914 missing "": 8,564/32,008

examples: ""  
 "Cca (Circuit Cards)"  
 "Humanitarian Demining"  
 "Rule of Law and Human Rights"

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region UN region code

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type: string (str25)  
 unique values: 22 missing "": 2,857/32,008

examples: "Central America"  
 "Northern Africa"  
 "South-Eastern Asia"  
 "Western Africa"

---

footnote sources (Security Assistance Monitor 2019)

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type: string (str756)  
 unique values: 187 missing "": 8,494/32,008

examples: ""  
 "Actual Allocation from U.S. Department of State, FY2019 Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations Supplementary Tables (Washington: March 2018)"  
 "United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Excess Defense Articles online database, Accessed Jan. 12, 2016"  
 "United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015: A Report to Congress (Washington: August 2015)"

---

country\_std standardized country name

---

type: string (str37)  
 unique values: 241 missing "": 25/32,008

examples: "Cook Islands"  
 "Israel"  
 "Morocco"

1  
2  
3 "Syria"  
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5

6 -----  
7 provider

Managing agency  
8 -----

9 type: numeric (float)

10 label: provider

11 range: [1,4]

units: 1

12 unique values: 4

missing: 0/32,008  
13  
14

15 [1] DOD – Department of Defense

16 [2] DOS – Department of State

17 [3] Combined – DOD and DOS

18 [4] Other  
19

20 -----  
21 command

US Combatant Command  
22 -----

23 type: numeric (float)

24 label: command

25 range: [1,6]

units: 1

26 unique values: 6

missing: 2,419/32,008  
27  
28  
29

30 [1] Africa Command

31 [2] Central Command

32 [3] European Command

33 [4] Indo-Pacific Command

34 [5] Northern Command

35 [6] Southern Command  
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Table A1. Summary Statistics for USASSA Dataset (country-year unit of analysis)

Variable	Obs	Unique	Mean	Min	Max	Label
country	3748	192	.	.	.	(firstnm) country
ccode	3748	192	479.9194	20	990	COW country code
ccode_iso	3748	192	467.3047	4	6881	(firstnm) ccode_iso
year	3748	20	2009.522	2000	2019	year
received_SA	3748	2	.870064	0	1	country received assistance in year
total_SA	3748	3168	7.88e+07	0	1.14e+10	total security assistance
material	3748	932	1.96e+07	0	3.84e+09	amount of material aid
training	3748	622	1710312	0	4.34e+08	amount of training aid
train equip	3748	827	2.62e+07	0	1.06e+10	amount of train equip aid
education	3748	2770	876597.2	0	8.32e+08	amount of education aid
logistical	3748	285	1341538	0	1.44e+09	amount of logistical aid
exercises	3748	197	307059.4	0	2.08e+08	amount of exercises aid
SSR	3748	279	1654745	0	5.69e+08	amount of SSR aid
policing	3748	454	1544397	0	8.50e+08	amount of policing aid
counternar~s	3748	485	2257286	0	9.26e+08	amount of counternarcotics aid
humanitarian	3748	299	1068167	0	1.56e+08	amount of humanitarian aid
counterpr~on	3748	235	1407711	0	3.80e+08	amount of counterproliferation aid
other_nonl~l	3748	202	241972.1	0	3.27e+08	amount of other_nonlethal aid
unclear	3748	1169	2.11e+07	0	3.10e+09	amount of unclear aid
lethal	3748	1596	4.73e+07	0	1.07e+10	material, training, & train equip
nonlethal	3748	2883	5232382	0	8.32e+08	education, SSR, humanitarian, counterproliferation,
DOD_SA	3748	2703	3.80e+07	0	1.09e+10	Amount managed by State
DOS_SA	3748	2274	4.07e+07	0	3.83e+09	Amount managed by DoD
Joint_SA	3748	122	54666.2	0	9.58e+07	Amount managed jointly
material_bin	3748	2	.3060299	0	1	country received aidtype in year
training_bin	3748	2	.2161153	0	1	country received aidtype in year
train equi~n	3748	2	.3596585	0	1	country received aidtype in year
education_~n	3748	2	.772412	0	1	country received aidtype in year
logistical~n	3748	2	.0987193	0	1	country received aidtype in year
exercises_~n	3748	2	.064301	0	1	country received aidtype in year
SSR_bin	3748	2	.1286019	0	1	country received aidtype in year
policing_bin	3748	2	.1734258	0	1	country received aidtype in year

1	counternar~n	3748	2	.1574173	0	1	country received aidtype in year
2	humanitar~in	3748	2	.1467449	0	1	country received aidtype in year
3	counterpr~in	3748	2	.0747065	0	1	country received aidtype in year
4	other_nonl~n	3748	2	.0845784	0	1	country received aidtype in year
5	unclear_bin	3748	2	.4076841	0	1	country received aidtype in year
6	trainEquip~n	3748	2	.5338847	0	1	country received aidtype in year
7	lethal_bin	3748	2	.5610993	0	1	country received aidtype in year
8	nonlethal_~n	3748	2	.8068303	0	1	country received aidtype in year
9	trainAdvis~n	3748	2	.8113661	0	1	country received aidtype in year
10	ground	3748	199	1.04e+07	0	5.54e+09	aid to ground forces
11	air	3748	417	3108896	0	1.87e+09	aid to air forces
12	naval	3748	268	1821269	0	1.30e+09	aid to naval/maritime
13	police	3748	301	3576275	0	1.35e+09	aid to police
14	specialized	3748	135	226444.3	0	5.09e+08	aid to special forces
15	civilians	3748	323	1562245	0	4.23e+08	aid to gov officials/other civilians
16	unspecified	3748	2092	2.81e+07	0	1.07e+10	aid to unspecified security forces
17	unknown	3748	2949	2.99e+07	0	3.83e+09	aid to recipient unknown
18	program1	3748	17	2.07e+07	0	1.06e+10	(sum) program1
19	program2	3748	23	29058.16	0	2.62e+07	(sum) program2
20	program3	3748	338	3414.901	0	165943	(sum) program3
21	program4	3748	45	4169448	0	1.50e+09	(sum) program4
22	program5	3748	1393	87986.48	0	2736718	(sum) program5
23	program6	3748	148	1373673	0	3.80e+08	(sum) program6
24	program7	3748	7	1194664	0	1.27e+09	(sum) program7
25	program8	3748	12	456074.5	0	6.20e+08	(sum) program8
26	program9	3748	18	163.8207	0	166000	(sum) program9
27	program10	3748	27	4677.208	0	4303903	(sum) program10
28	program11	3748	86	1265.402	0	205431	(sum) program11
29	program12	3748	158	10078.92	0	2440264	(sum) program12
30	program13	3748	35	266604.6	0	1.65e+08	(sum) program13
31	program14	3748	2	66702.24	0	2.50e+08	(sum) program14
32	program15	3748	5	46117.93	0	7.35e+07	(sum) program15
33	program16	3748	298	583910.3	0	1.02e+08	(sum) program16
34	FMF	3748	703	2.76e+07	0	3.30e+09	(sum) program17
35	program18	3748	72	107612.1	0	3.31e+07	(sum) program18
36	program19	3748	20	8948.201	0	5066092	(sum) program19
37	program20	3748	1	0	0	0	(sum) program20



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	program21	3748	5	5069.37	0	8000000	(sum) program21
	program22	3748	4	5947.172	0	8020000	(sum) program22
	program23	3748	32	5570.971	0	2860000	(sum) program23
	IMET	3748	1294	466385.1	0	5000000	(sum) program24
	INCLA	3748	323	6101032	0	1.20e+09	(sum) program25
	program26	3748	8	5487292	0	5.54e+09	(sum) program26
	program27	3748	4	867796.2	0	1.62e+09	(sum) program27
	program28	3748	20	1403643	0	7.29e+08	(sum) program28
	program29	3748	122	54666.2	0	9.58e+07	(sum) program29
	program30	3748	446	68307.27	0	1.11e+07	(sum) program30
	program31	3748	671	1208918	0	9.08e+07	(sum) program31
	program32	3748	5	627534.7	0	8.00e+08	(sum) program32
	program33	3748	179	1256792	0	2.54e+08	(sum) program33
	program34	3748	1992	58832.47	0	1339749	(sum) program34
	SEC1004	3748	759	1961094	0	3.25e+08	(sum) program35
	SEC1033	3748	94	123883.3	0	5.50e+07	(sum) program36
	program37	3748	218	1033698	0	4.46e+08	(sum) program37
	program38	3748	31	139953.2	0	7.50e+07	(sum) program38
	program39	3748	117	548512.4	0	2.04e+08	(sum) program39
	program40	3748	7	13209.71	0	4.18e+07	(sum) program40
	program41	3748	66	3253.085	0	726511	(sum) program41
	program42	3748	3	160085.4	0	3.50e+08	(sum) program42
	program43	3748	81	17345.28	0	4669708	(sum) program43
	program47	3748	46	466.448	0	207501	(sum) program47
	program48	3748	18	313.0128	0	354000	(sum) program48
	program50	3748	51	1021.172	0	380566	(sum) program50
	program51	3748	326	36513.62	0	1.57e+07	(sum) program51
	program59	3748	1	0	0	0	(sum) program59
	program61	3748	1	0	0	0	(sum) program61
	program62	3748	2	133404.5	0	5.00e+08	(sum) program62
	program64	3748	1	0	0	0	(sum) program64
	program65	3748	1	0	0	0	(sum) program65
	region	3680	22	.	.	.	(firstnm) region
	command	3728	6	3.051502	1	6	US Combatant Command

## Appendix B. Sample of observations for Niger between 2012 and 2014

### Line item level of analysis (sample)

State	Year	Amount	Program name	Item
Niger	2012	55233	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	
Niger	2012	236137	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	National Defense University (NDU), Defense Institute Of
Niger	2012	28192	Excess Defense Articles	Textiles, Clothing, Personal Gear And Equipment
Niger	2012	47000	International Military Education and Training	
Niger	2012	11746000	Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority	Air Mobility Package (2 X Cessna 208 Caravans)
Niger	2013	436666	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	
Niger	2013	824000	Foreign Military Financing	Africa Regional Counterterrorism
Niger	2013	273000	International Military Education and Training	
Niger	2013	16160	Regional Centers for Security Studies	
Niger	2013	2170000	Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance	Infrastructure
Niger	2013	8500000	Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority	Logistics Company (Ct Support)
Niger	2014	7469	Aviation Leadership Program	Intro Flight Training / Aviation Leadership Program (Alp)
Niger	2014	14718	Aviation Leadership Program	American Language Course
Niger	2014	55116	Aviation Leadership Program	
Niger	2014	3100	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	Senior Executive Seminar
Niger	2014	4357	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	Mobile Education Team (MET) Civil-Military Responses To Terrorism
Niger	2014	6850	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	Program On Terrorism And Security Studies (PTSS)
Niger	2014	27000	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	Mobile Education Team (MET) Combating Terrorism (CT) - Respo..
Niger	2014	50471	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program Homeland Defense Shor..
Niger	2014	302600	Developing Country Combined Exercise Program	Exercise Related To Degrading Violent Extremist Org
Niger	2014	356000	International Military Education and Training	
Niger	2014	2094000	Peacekeeping Operations	Peacekeeping
Niger	2014	1463	Regional Centers for Security Studies	African Executive Dialogue
Niger	2014	2110	Regional Centers for Security Studies	Maritime Criminal Justice Zone E Workshop
Niger	2014	2932	Regional Centers for Security Studies	Program On Terrorism And Security Studies (PTSS)
Niger	2014	5748	Regional Centers for Security Studies	Counter Illicit Trafficking (CIT) In The Trans Sahel
Niger	2014	33000	Section 1004 Counter-Drug Assistance	Training
Niger	2014	14700000	Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority	Counterterrorism Battalion
Niger	2014	24800000	Section 1206 Train and Equip Authority	Aircraft And Intelligence, Surveillance And Reconnaissance (..

### Country-Year level of analysis (2014)

Country	year	total SA	material	training	education	policing	humanitarian	exercises	SSR	lethal	nonlethal	unclear
Niger	2014	39898382	36900000	40469	506197	0	2094000	302600	0	3.69e+07	2600197	55116

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## Amount of Assistance, 2001-2019, in Millions of USD

ForeignAssistance.gov

USASSA security assistance

Country Name	military aid	country	total security assistance	USASSA security assistance - FA.gov military aid	lethal aid	USASSA lethal aid - FA.gov military aid
Afghanistan	72,900.0	Afghanistan	89,500.0	16,600.0	80,900.0	8,000.0
Albania	145.0	Albania	199.0	54.0	65.7	-79.3
Algeria	33.7	Algeria	38.1	4.4	18.1	-15.6
Angola	7.7	Angola	109.0	101.3	.4	-7.3
Antigua and Barbuda	14.7	Antigua and Barbuda	9.1	-5.6	3.9	-10.8
Argentina	27.3	Argentina	52.8	25.5	21.5	-5.8
Armenia	150.0	Armenia	210.0	60.0	70.4	-79.6
Aruba	.0	Aruba	.0	.0	.0	.0
Australia	.5	Australia	1.0	.4	.2	-.3
Austria	.0	Austria	.4	.4	.0	.0
Azerbaijan	167.0	Azerbaijan	417.0	250.0	187.0	20.0
Bahamas	90.0	Bahamas	83.9	-6.1	70.9	-19.1
Bahrain	386.0	Bahrain	418.0	32.0	206.0	-180.0
Bangladesh	185.0	Bangladesh	273.0	88.0	212.0	27.0
Barbados	13.9	Barbados	12.1	-1.8	7.3	-6.6
Belarus	.0	Belarus	2.5	2.5	1.1	1.1
Belgium	.1	Belgium	.0	.0	.0	-.1
Belize	79.5	Belize	77.7	-1.8	60.7	-18.8
Benin	12.7	Benin	23.8	11.1	5.1	-7.6
Bhutan	.4	Bhutan	.6	.2	.0	-.4
Bolivia	44.6	Bolivia	719.0	674.4	416.0	371.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	129.0	Bosnia and Herzegovina	264.0	135.0	81.5	-47.5
Botswana	19.5	Botswana	24.6	5.1	2.3	-17.2
Brazil	59.1	Brazil	89.0	29.9	55.2	-3.9

1							
2	Brunei	.4	Brunei	1.2	.8	.4	.0
3	Bulgaria	215.0	Bulgaria	265.0	50.0	143.0	-72.0
4	Burkina Faso	35.6	Burkina Faso	68.6	33.0	51.8	16.2
5	Burma (Myanmar)	4.3	Burma	20.1	15.8	5.6	1.3
6	Burundi	46.9	Burundi	56.1	9.2	34.0	-12.9
8	Cambodia	16.1	Cambodia	140.0	123.9	30.9	14.8
9	Cameroon	66.9	Cameroon	236.0	169.1	169.0	102.1
10	Canada	.2	Canada	.1	-.1	.0	-.2
11	Cabo Verde	42.2	Cape Verde	17.0	-25.2	11.2	-31.0
12	Central African Republic	34.8	Central African Republic	92.0	57.2	54.3	19.5
14	Chad	88.7	Chad	226.0	137.3	136.0	47.3
15	Chile	44.2	Chile	50.6	6.4	20.0	-24.2
16	China (P.R.C.)	6.8	China	18.1	11.3	1.2	-5.6
17							
18	Colombia	2,950.0	Colombia	9,080.0	6,130.0	6,640.0	3,690.0
19	Comoros	3.4	Comoros	5.3	1.9	.2	-3.2
20	Costa Rica	85.4	Costa Rica	61.8	-23.6	33.8	-51.6
21	Cote d'Ivoire	8.4	Cote d'Ivoire	10.0	1.6	4.0	-4.4
22	Croatia	113.0	Croatia	138.0	25.0	84.3	-28.7
23	Curacao	44.3	Curacao	48.7	4.4		-44.3
24							
25	Cyprus	.1	Cyprus	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5
26	Czechia	182.0	Czech Republic	191.0	9.0	95.1	-86.9
27	Congo (Kinshasa)	94.9	Democratic Republic of Cong	256.0	161.1	173.0	78.1
28	Denmark	.0	Denmark	.0	.0	.0	.0
29							
30	Djibouti	148.0	Djibouti	158.0	10.0	94.1	-53.9
31	Dominica	8.2	Dominica	5.3	-2.9	3.3	-4.8
32	Dominican Republic	86.9	Dominican Republic	101.0	14.1	56.0	-30.9
33	Ecuador	226.0	Ecuador	449.0	223.0	318.0	92.0
34							
35	Egypt	22,400.0	Egypt	24,700.0	2,300.0	5,910.0	-16,490.0
36	El Salvador	175.0	El Salvador	176.0	1.0	120.0	-55.0
37	Equatorial Guinea	.0	Equatorial Guinea	.4	.4	.0	.0
38	Eritrea	1.4	Eritrea	11.2	9.8	.0	-1.4
39	Estonia	280.0	Estonia	249.0	-31.0	139.0	-141.0
40	Eswatini	3.3			-3.3	.4	-2.9
41							
42	Ethiopia	67.8	Ethiopia	148.0	80.2	89.8	22.0
43							
44							
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2	Fiji	4.1	Fiji	4.9	.8	1.2	-2.9
3	Finland	.0	Finland	.2	.2	.0	.0
4	France	.1	France	115.0	114.9	.0	-.1
5	Gabon	9.8	Gabon	16.0	6.2	3.8	-6.1
6	Gambia	4.1	Gambia	4.7	.5	.8	-3.4
7	Georgia	709.0	Georgia	1,370.0	661.0	671.0	-38.0
8	Germany	5.3	Germany	2.4	-2.9	2.3	-3.1
9	Ghana	48.0	Ghana	51.7	3.7	28.9	-19.1
10	Greece	221.0	Greece	130.0	-91.0	122.0	-99.0
11	Grenada	9.1	Grenada	5.6	-3.5	3.4	-5.7
12	Guatemala	203.0	Guatemala	257.0	54.0	211.0	8.0
13	Guinea	17.9	Guinea	18.9	1.0	4.0	-13.9
14	Guinea-Bissau	1.6	Guinea-Bissau	4.5	2.9	.9	-.8
15	Guyana	12.6	Guyana	17.9	5.3	8.1	-4.5
16	Haiti	29.6	Haiti	243.0	213.4	78.0	48.4
17	Honduras	152.0	Honduras	167.0	15.0	113.0	-39.0
18	Hungary	134.0	Hungary	155.0	21.0	74.8	-59.2
19	Iceland	.8	Iceland	.1	-.7	.1	-.7
20	India	40.2	India	102.0	61.8	57.7	17.5
21	Indonesia	340.0	Indonesia	618.0	278.0	426.0	86.0
22	Iran	.0	Iran	.0	.0	.0	.0
23	Iraq	28,700.0	Iraq	33,000.0	4,300.0	30,000.0	1,300.0
24	Ireland	.0	Ireland	.4	.4	.0	.0
25	Israel	51,900.0	Israel	57,300.0	5,400.0	14,600.0	-37,300.0
26	Italy	2.6	Italy	2.6	.0	2.1	-.5
27	Jamaica	48.1	Jamaica	62.7	14.6	41.2	-6.9
28	Japan	.1	Japan	.3	.3	.1	.1
29	Jordan	6,390.0	Jordan	8,690.0	2,300.0	5,760.0	-630.0
30	Kazakhstan	530.0	Kazakhstan	786.0	256.0	209.0	-321.0
31	Kenya	482.0	Kenya	685.0	203.0	490.0	8.0
32	Kiribati, Republic of	.2	Kiribati	.4	.2	.0	-.2
33	Kosovo	74.9	Kosovo	159.0	84.1	43.1	-31.8
34	Kuwait	.5	Kuwait	3.2	2.7	2.9	2.4
35	Kyrgyzstan	183.0	Kyrgyzstan	529.0	346.0	441.0	258.0
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2	Laos	14.0	Laos	212.0	198.0	6.9	-7.1
3	Latvia	211.0	Latvia	282.0	71.0	169.0	-42.0
4	<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>1,310.0</b>	<b>Lebanon</b>	<b>2,510.0</b>	<b>1,200.0</b>	<b>1,960.0</b>	<b>650.0</b>
5	Lesotho	1.9	Lesotho	3.3	1.5	.4	-1.5
6	Liberia	212.0	Liberia	426.0	214.0	269.0	57.0
7	Libya	68.2	Libya	160.0	91.8	81.8	13.6
8	Lithuania	305.0	Lithuania	300.0	-5.0	185.0	-120.0
9			Macedonia	161.0	161.0	62.8	62.8
10							
11	Madagascar	6.8	Madagascar	7.6	.8	.5	-6.3
12	Malawi	8.1	Malawi	11.3	3.2	1.9	-6.2
13	Malaysia	207.0	Malaysia	165.0	-42.0	106.0	-101.0
14	Maldives	24.7	Maldives	38.8	14.1	24.1	-6
15	Mali	32.1	Mali	202.0	169.9	169.0	136.9
16	Malta	24.1	Malta	31.4	7.3	20.5	-3.6
17	Marshall Islands	1.5	Marshall Islands	1.8	.3	1.4	-1
18	Martinique	.2	Martinique	.1	.0	.0	-2
19	Mauritania	97.4	Mauritania	139.0	41.6	78.3	-19.1
20	Mauritius	6.3	Mauritius	9.9	3.5	2.4	-3.9
21							
22	<b>Mexico</b>	<b>946.0</b>	<b>Mexico</b>	<b>3,250.0</b>	<b>2,304.0</b>	<b>1,920.0</b>	<b>974.0</b>
23							
24	Micronesia, Federated States of	3.1	Micronesia	13.8	10.7	12.6	9.5
25	Moldova	95.5	Moldova	188.0	92.5	59.3	-36.2
26	Mongolia	84.3	Mongolia	86.4	2.1	36.0	-48.3
27	Montenegro	22.2	Montenegro	55.0	32.8	22.6	.4
28	Morocco	558.0	Morocco	515.0	-43.0	352.0	-206.0
29	Mozambique	11.0	Mozambique	41.0	30.0	3.2	-7.8
30	Namibia	2.2	Namibia	4.1	2.0	.1	-2.1
31	Nauru	.2	Nauru	.1	-.1	.0	-2
32	Nepal	80.1	Nepal	142.0	61.9	44.4	-35.7
33	Netherlands	.3	Netherlands	.5	.2	.1	-2
34	Netherlands Antilles (former)	172.0	Netherlands Antilles	138.0	-34.0	70.7	-101.3
35	New Zealand	.0	New Zealand	.1	.0	.0	.0
36	Nicaragua	52.5	Nicaragua	63.6	11.1	46.8	-5.7
37	Niger	104.0	Niger	254.0	150.0	161.0	57.0
38	Nigeria	130.0	Nigeria	198.0	68.0	123.0	-7.0
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2	Korea, Democratic Republic of	.0	North Korea	170.0	155.5	.0	.0
3	North Macedonia	123.0	North Macedonia	11.2	-111.8	62.8	-60.2
4	Norway	.0	Norway	.4	.4	.0	.0
5	Oman	324.0	Oman	351.0	27.0	163.0	-161.0
6	<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>5,480.0</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>23,300.0</b>	<b>17,820.0</b>	<b>22,200.0</b>	<b>16,720.0</b>
7	Palau	1.8	Palau	12.1	10.3	11.6	9.8
8			<b>Palestinian Territories</b>	<b>1,040.0</b>	<b>1,040.0</b>	336.0	336.0
9	Panama	135.0	Panama	156.0	21.0	114.0	-21.0
10	Papua New Guinea	4.7	Papua New Guinea	5.4	.6	.0	-4.7
11	Paraguay	21.7	Paraguay	39.4	17.7	16.2	-5.5
12	<b>Peru</b>	<b>220.0</b>	<b>Peru</b>	<b>1,450.0</b>	<b>1,230.0</b>	<b>815.0</b>	<b>595.0</b>
13	Philippines	1,240.0	Philippines	1,320.0	80.0	806.0	-434.0
14	<b>Poland</b>	<b>2,410.0</b>	<b>Poland</b>	<b>574.0</b>	<b>-1,836.0</b>	<b>333.0</b>	<b>-2,077.0</b>
15	Portugal	11.1	Portugal	9.9	-1.2	3.7	-7.4
16	Qatar	.2	Qatar	7.5	7.3	3.8	3.5
17	Congo (Brazzaville)	3.8	Republic of Congo	9.5	5.7	.0	-3.8
18	Romania	370.0	Romania	374.0	4.0	241.0	-129.0
19	Russia	2,550.0	Russia	2,880.0	330.0	58.7	-2,491.3
20	Rwanda	18.4	Rwanda	23.0	4.6	1.9	-16.5
21	Samoa	1.0	Samoa	1.3	.3	.0	-1.0
22	Sao Tome and Principe	5.9	Sao Tome and Principe	7.0	1.1	1.3	-4.7
23	Saudi Arabia	.5	Saudi Arabia	22.6	22.1	4.3	3.8
24	Senegal	81.5	Senegal	90.8	9.3	51.9	-29.6
25	Serbia	28.6	Serbia	77.8	49.2	27.4	-1.2
26	Serbia and Montenegro (form	.7	Serbia and Montenegro	6.4	5.7	2.4	1.7
27	Seychelles	13.8	Seychelles	6.0	-7.8	1.4	-12.4
28	Sierra Leone	20.8	Sierra Leone	69.5	48.7	11.0	-9.8
29	Singapore	.3	Singapore	10.2	9.9	5.8	5.5
30	Slovak Republic	89.9	Slovakia	82.3	-7.6	18.4	-71.5
31	Slovenia	46.9	Slovenia	41.2	-5.7	8.3	-38.6
32	Solomon Islands	1.0	Solomon Islands	1.2	.2	.0	-1.0
33	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>1,260.0</b>	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>3,150.0</b>	<b>1,890.0</b>	<b>1,970.0</b>	<b>710.0</b>
34	South Africa	44.2	South Africa	76.5	32.3	14.4	-29.8
35	Korea, Republic of	14.5	South Korea	11.4	-3.1	.9	-13.6
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2	South Sudan	265.0	South Sudan	625.0	360.0	418.0	153.0
3	Spain	.5	Spain	.9	.4	.7	.2
4	Sri Lanka	43.4	Sri Lanka	159.0	115.6	78.9	35.5
5	St. Kitts and Nevis	8.9	St Kitts and Nevis	6.1	-2.7	3.6	-5.3
6	St. Lucia	6.2	St. Lucia	6.1	-1	2.9	-3.3
7	St. Vincent and Grenadines	6.9	St Vincent and the Grenadin	4.3	-2.6	3.2	-3.7
8	Sudan	558.2	Sudan	633.0	74.8	424.0	-134.2
9	Suriname	9.9	Suriname	16.6	6.7	7.9	-2.0
10			Swaziland	5.1	5.1	.4	.4
11			Sweden	.1	.7	.6	-.1
12	Sweden	.1	Sweden	.7	.6	.0	-.1
13	Switzerland	.2	Switzerland	.3	.1	.0	-.2
14	Syria	32.3	Syria	2,610.0	2,577.7	2,200.0	2,167.7
15	Taiwan	.0	Taiwan	31.9	31.9	28.1	28.1
16	Tajikistan	205.0	Tajikistan	368.0	163.0	301.0	96.0
17	Tanzania	42.9	Tanzania	48.4	5.5	21.1	-21.8
18	Thailand	154.0	Thailand	255.0	101.0	161.0	7.0
19	Timor-Leste	14.4	Timor-Leste	53.3	38.9	13.9	-.5
20	Togo	9.5	Togo	11.1	1.6	4.8	-4.6
21	Tonga	7.9	Tonga	9.3	1.4	3.7	-4.2
22	Trinidad and Tobago	12.8	Trinidad and Tobago	23.8	11.0	12.9	.1
23	Tunisia	750.0	Tunisia	907.0	157.0	394.0	-356.0
24	Turkey	272.0	Turkey	311.0	39.0	107.0	-165.0
25	Turkmenistan	42.7	Turkmenistan	66.5	23.8	52.4	9.7
26	Turks and Caicos Islands	.0	Turks and Caicos	.1	.1	.0	.0
27	Tuvalu	.2	Tuvalu	.4	.2	.0	-.2
28	Uganda	376.0	Uganda	382.0	6.0	213.0	-163.0
29	Ukraine	1,620.0	Ukraine	2,460.0	840.0	1,400.0	-220.0
30	United Arab Emirates	1.3	United Arab Emirates	8.5	7.2	7.6	6.2
31	United Kingdom	6.3	United Kingdom	4.9	-1.3	4.9	-1.4
32	Uruguay	12.9	Uruguay	17.0	4.1	1.8	-11.1
33	Uzbekistan	229.0	Uzbekistan	350.0	121.0	166.0	-63.0
34	Vanuatu	1.1	Vanuatu	1.5	.4	.0	-1.1
35	Venezuela	25.5	Venezuela	30.0	4.5	14.5	-11.0
36	Vietnam	192.0	Vietnam	246.0	54.0	74.3	-117.7
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2	Yemen	269.0	Yemen	918.0	649.0	608.0
3	Zambia	7.3	Zambia	12.8	5.5	.4
4	Zimbabwe	.0	Zimbabwe	6.6	6.6	.0
5	<b>Sum</b>	<b>216,698.3</b>		<b>289,598.4</b>	<b>72,885.6</b>	<b>190,207.8</b>
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Note: Red highlighting indicates cases in which USASSA reports security assistance amounts that are billions of dollars greater (and/or lethal aid amounts that are at least \$500 million greater) than the military aid reported at ForeignAssistance.gov. Blue highlighting indicates cases in which the amount of military aid reported at ForeignAssistance.gov is at least one billion more than total security assistance, or \$500 million more than lethal aid, in the USASSA dataset.

For Peer Review

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3 **Amount of Assistance, 2001-2019, in Millions of USD**

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	<b>ForeignAssistance.gov Military assistance</b>	<b>USASSA security assistance</b>	<i>USASSA security assistance - FA.gov</i>	<b>% Difference</b>
8 2001	4,360.0	5,710.0	1,350.0	24%
9 2002	4,890.0	8,490.0	3,600.0	42%
10 2003	8,300.0	10,800.0	2,500.0	23%
11 2004	6,300.0	10,800.0	4,500.0	42%
12 2005	7,880.0	17,500.0	9,620.0	55%
13 2006	10,900.0	14,500.0	3,600.0	25%
14 2007	13,200.0	24,400.0	11,200.0	46%
15 2008	15,700.0	16,600.0	900.0	5%
16 2009	15,200.0	18,600.0	3,400.0	18%
17 2010	13,400.0	23,700.0	10,300.0	43%
18 2011	16,800.0	24,400.0	7,600.0	31%
19 2012	15,100.0	22,200.0	7,100.0	32%
20 2013	14,600.0	18,400.0	3,800.0	21%
21 2014	10,500.0	17,400.0	6,900.0	40%
22 2015	15,900.0	19,700.0	3,800.0	19%
23 2016	13,600.0	19,900.0	6,300.0	32%
24 2017	11,700.0	22,800.0	11,100.0	49%
25 2018	13,800.0	19,800.0	6,000.0	30%
26 2019	13,400.0	18,500.0	5,100.0	28%
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32	<b>Sum</b>	<b>225,530.0</b>	<b>334,200.0</b>	<b>108,670.0</b>
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34 Note: Annual amounts are higher than country amounts due to aid for which recipient country is not  
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**USASSA security assistance**

<i>nonlethal</i>	<i>unclear</i>	<i>lethal</i>
950.0	4,150.0	613.0
1,070.0	4,950.0	2,480.0
1,060.0	6,960.0	2,740.0
1,980.0	6,070.0	2,700.0
1,350.0	6,990.0	9,130.0
1,390.0	4,740.0	8,360.0
1,510.0	5,670.0	17,200.0
861.0	5,340.0	10,400.0
1,450.0	4,800.0	12,300.0
1,470.0	5,620.0	16,600.0
1,620.0	6,440.0	16,400.0
2,470.0	6,190.0	13,500.0
2,840.0	5,330.0	10,200.0
2,530.0	6,810.0	8,050.0
2,370.0	3,390.0	13,900.0
2,570.0	7,540.0	9,840.0
1,730.0	3,720.0	17,300.0
1,690.0	4,800.0	13,300.0
1,690.0	6,040.0	10,800.0
<b>32,601.0</b>	<b>105,550.0</b>	<b>195,813.0</b>

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3 **Amount of Assistance, 2001-2019, in Millions of USD**

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5 **ForeignAssistance.gov**

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8 <b>US Sector Name</b>	<b>military aid</b>	<b>economic aid</b>	<b>total aid</b>	<b>% military</b>
9 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction	6,270.0	7,124.1	13,394.1	47%
10 Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation	894.0	6,365.0	7,259.0	12%
11 Counter-Narcotics	7,820.0	7,156.1	14,976.1	52%
12 Counter-Terrorism	2,110.0	2,982.5	5,092.5	41%
13 Direct Administrative Costs	3.2	37,445.0	37,448.2	0.0%
14 Good Governance	1,830.0	16,217.1	18,047.1	10%
15 Health - General	.04	4,231.3	4,231.3	0.0%
16 Infrastructure	294.0	27,825.5	28,119.5	1.0%
17 Multi-sector - Unspecified	6.5	10,003.1	10,009.7	0.1%
18 Peace and Security - General	7,262.5	.0	7,262.5	100%
19 Protection, Assistance and Solutions	311.0	84,946.2	85,257.2	0.4%
20 Rule of Law and Human Rights	3.2	26,152.8	26,156.0	0.0%
21 Stabilization Operations and Security Se	205,396.8	.0	205,396.8	100%
22 Trade and Investment	3.4	3,771.2	3,774.6	0.1%
23 <b>Sum</b>	<b>232,204.5</b>	<b>234,219.9</b>	<b>466,424.5</b>	

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30 Note: Only sectors that had some amount of assistance categorized as military aid  
31 between 2001 and 2019 are included in this table.  
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**USASSA security assistance**

<b>aid type</b>	<b>nonlethal</b>	<b>unclear</b>	<b>lethal</b>
[1]material			85,900.0
[2]training			7,000.0
[3]combat assist			730.0
[4]train & equip			102,000.0
[5]education	4,180.0		
[6]logistical/technical		6,560.0	
[7]joint exercises		1,240.0	
[8]SSR	8,870.0		
[9]law enforcement		10,800.0	
[10]counternarcotics		8,980.0	
[11]humanitarian	5,020.0		
[12]counterproliferation	12,000.0		
[13]other nonlethal	2,560.0		
[14]unclear		78,000.0	
<b>Sum</b>	<b>32,630.0</b>	<b>105,580.0</b>	<b>195,630.0</b>

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