International Interactions
Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations

Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes

Patricia Lynne Sullivan [a]; Scott Sigmund Gartner [b]
[a] Department of International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs, The University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA
[b] Department of Political Science, The University of California, Davis, California, USA

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Disaggregating Peace: Domestic Politics and Dispute Outcomes

PATRICIA LYNNE SULLIVAN

*Department of International Affairs, School of Public and International Affairs,
The University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, USA*

SCOTT SIGMUND GARTNER

Department of Political Science, The University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA

Drawing on arguments about the domestic political costs of using force and the ability of states to signal resolve, we develop a selection effects-based model of militarized interstate dispute outcomes. By disaggregating dispute outcomes to capture important theoretical distinctions among different types of "peaceful" resolutions to militarized disputes, we are able to generate new hypotheses about the effects of regime type on conflict escalation. Employing a multinomial logit analysis on disputes since 1816, we find that democracy has both monadic and dyadic effects on dispute escalation and that the effect of regime type varies with a state's role in a dispute. Disputes with democratic initiators are less likely to escalate to violence because democratic initiators are more likely than nondemocratic initiators to obtain target concessions without employing force. Democratic targets, on the other hand, select themselves out of disputes by making concessions at a higher rate than nondemocracies, unless the dispute initiator demands a change in the target's governance or the territorial status quo. Both patterns provide evidence that democracies are more selective about the disputes they escalate to violence, rather than more pacific overall.

We begin with the observation that only a minority of interstate disputes escalate to war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1986; Jones, Bremer, and

Singer, 1996; Organski and Kugler, 1980). Even after one or more states in a disagreement threatens to use force, most disputes end short of mutual hostilities. Yet many studies of conflict escalation focus on the probability of war and ignore important distinctions among different "peaceful" international dispute outcomes.

Unfortunately, knowing what increases or decreases the probability of war tells us little about how peace is achieved in the vast majority of disputes, and there is comparatively less knowledge about the effects of regime type on dispute behavior short of war (Oneal and Russett, 1997; Reed, 2000). Even after a crisis escalates to the point where one state threatens to use military force, both sides have multiple opportunities to select themselves out of the crisis before it escalates to war. In order to represent critical distinctions among different paths to peace, we disaggregate dispute outcomes short of mutual hostilities, creating separate categories for disputes in which the initiator backs down, a target state makes concessions following the unilateral use of force by the initiator, or the target makes concessions without any use of force by the initiator. Our dependent variable thus captures escalatory and de-escalatory behavior by both target and initiator states, and as a result, represents a wider range of possible dispute outcomes than most previous studies.

Recent research has moved beyond tests of the proposition that democracies do not fight wars against one another to explore other ways in which democratic political institutions affect the escalation, de-escalation, and resolution of international conflicts (Bennett and Stam, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Fortna, 2003; Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Irelund and Garther, 2001; Partell and Palmer, 1999; Reed, 2000; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Schultz, 1999, 2001b; Stam, 1996; Stinnett and Diehl, 2001). Together, these studies are important both because they expand the breadth of international behavior under investigation and because they offer new insights into the causal mechanism underlying previous empirical findings. We build on these studies by exploring how expectations about the domestic political effects of conflict escalation influence states' conciliatory and escalatory behavior and how these effects differ for the initiators versus the targets of disputes. We argue that regime type affects both the nature of the disputes a state selects itself into and its behavior once it finds itself in a militarized dispute. Drawing on arguments about the domestic political costs of using force and the ability of states to signal resolve, we develop a selection effects-based model of militarized interstate dispute outcomes. Our approach endogenizes selection effects, allowing us to deduce hypotheses about the outcomes we expect to observe given selection bias (Danilovic, 2001). These hypotheses are then used to test indirectly for the existence of domestic political constraints that would otherwise only be partially observable (Schultz, 2001a).

Employing a multinomial logit analysis on disputes since 1816, we find that democracy has both monadic and dyadic effects on dispute escalation

and that the influence of regime type varies with a state's role in a dispute. Disputes with democratic *initiators* are less likely to escalate to violence because democratic initiators are more likely than nondemocratic initiators to obtain target concessions without employing force. Democratic *targets*, on the other hand, select themselves out of disputes by making concessions at a higher rate than nondemocracies unless the dispute initiator demands a change in the target's governance or the territorial status quo. The pattern of escalatory and de-escalatory behavior we observe in both democratic dispute initiators and democratic targets provides evidence that democracies are no more pacific than nondemocracies overall, but that they are more *selective* about the conflicts they escalate to violence.

PREDICTING DISPUTE OUTCOMES: RESOLVE AND CREDIBILITY

International conflicts become militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) when one state demands something from another state and backs up that demand with the threat, display, or use of force (Jones, et al., 1996). We sort MID outcomes into four distinct categories: the initiator can back down (*back down*), the target can back down without force being used by the initiator (*acquiescence*), the target can back down after force is used by the initiator (*capitulation*), or both sides can use force (*mutual hostilities*) (Leng, 1993; Maoz, 1984).

We argue that dispute outcomes are a function of a state's level of "resolve," or willingness to fight over the issue at stake, and its ability to send credible signals about that resolve. Although backing down is a prudent course of action for states that would prefer making concessions (or at least dropping their demands) to fighting a war, each state has an incentive to exaggerate its own willingness to fight in order to get a better deal from the other state (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999). States that do not intend to use force may nonetheless issue a threat to use force, hoping their opponent will acquiesce. Targets that would prefer to avoid war may nonetheless resist making concessions, in the hope that the initiator is bluffing.

Making concessions is costly, but so is being the target of military force. Both targets and initiators prefer target *acquiescence* to target *capitulation*. Targets unwilling to fight over an issue prefer to surrender (acquiesce) before an initiator uses force, rather than to capitulate after experiencing a military strike. Both actions require targets to make concessions on the issues at stake, but targets that grant concessions *after* force is used against them incur considerable additional costs—e.g., loss of life, degradation of military and industrial capabilities (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1992; Leng, 1983). The government of a target state that chooses to make concessions after military force has been employed by the initiator is likely to suffer greater damage to its domestic political and international reputation than

a regime that quietly makes concessions before an attack heightens public awareness.

Dispute initiators prefer target acquiescence to target capitulation because they would prefer to obtain concessions without having to employ costly force (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman, 1990). Target acquiescence, therefore, Pareto dominates target capitulation for both initiators and targets.

Nevertheless, target capitulation outcomes are possible because targets lack complete information about an initiator's true level of resolve. Unresolved initiators prefer the status quo to actually using force. But because the target does not know for certain whether or not the initiator is resolved to employ force, unresolved initiators have an incentive to *bluff* by making a threat to use force in the hope that an unresolved target will acquiesce to its demand without a fight. At the same time, uncertainty about the initiator's type provides an incentive for an unresolved target to resist a threat in the hope that the initiator was merely bluffing. The danger is that a target that is not willing to fight over the issues at state will mistakenly resist a *resolved* initiator. Targets that do not want a dispute to escalate to mutual hostilities, but refuse to make concessions because they mistakenly believe that an initiator is not resolved to use force, must capitulate after being attacked to avoid further dispute escalation.

When a dispute ends in *target capitulation*, it is an indication that the dispute initiator was unable to send a credible signal of its resolve. Since targets prefer *acquiescence* over *capitulation*, a credible threat by a resolved initiator should be enough to compel targets that would be willing to make concessions *after* they are attacked to make those concessions *before* they are attacked.

Next, we identify the theoretical processes by which *sensitivity to war costs* and *transparency* influence dispute outcomes through their effects on resolve and a state's ability to communicate its resolve.

War Cost Sensitivity

Democratic leaders are more sensitive than autocratic leaders to the costs of war participation. Autocratic leaders can be removed from office, and may lose more than just their job if they are deposed. But autocratic leaders can choose foreign policies that have disastrous consequences for the majority of their citizens as long as they continue to provide private benefits to the small group essential to their survival (Bueno de Mesquita, et al., 1999). In contrast, leaders of states with freedom of the press, vocal opposition movements, and open competition for positions of political leadership must be concerned about the cost/benefit ratio of war participation for the entire voting public. As a result, the leaders of democracies anticipate "higher domestic political costs for the use of force" (Bueno de Mesquita and

Lalman, 1992, p. 155). Moreover, as Downs and Rocke (1994) note, there are fewer means by which a chief executive can be removed in an autocracy and, "at the extreme there may be nothing more than the costly option of armed rebellion" (p. 363). Democratic leaders may anticipate higher domestic political costs for foreign policy failures because the probability that costs are imposed is higher in a democracy (Rousseau et al., 1996, p. 513).

These arguments suggest that, on average, democratic states should be less willing to use force than nondemocratic states. Schultz (1999, 2001b) reasons that if democratic leaders face higher political costs for waging war, they should be less credible when they attempt to signal their willingness to use force in a dispute. Our theoretical argument, however, anticipates a selection effect. Although democratic governments face a higher risk of removal for fighting a losing and/or costly war, there are clearly circumstances under which democracies are willing to fight. In fact, most empirical work finds that democratic regimes are as war-prone as nondemocratic regimes (Lake, 1992; Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993). Democracies, however, choose to participate in shorter, less costly conflicts and tend to select wars with a lower risk of defeat (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, 1995; Bennett and Stam, 1998; Reiter and Stam, 2002; Siverson, 1995).

In the population of all states, democracies may anticipate higher war costs on average. If so, democracies should make particularly attractive targets and democratic targets should be more prone to backing down than nondemocratic targets (an implication we explore later). However, in the population of dispute *initiators*, we argue that democracies are likely to have lower war costs on average because democracies are more sensitive to the costs of foreign policy failure. When they are not resolved to use force, democracies should be less likely to take actions that increase the risk of violent outcomes. Rather than decreasing their credibility, sensitivity to the cost of using military force makes the escalation of a conflict to a MID a particularly costly signal for democratic states.

Audience Costs and Transparency

A recent body of literature has focused specifically on the way in which democratic political institutions can improve a state's ability to send credible signals of resolve. Fearon (1994) contends that democratic leaders face higher domestic political costs for escalating an international crisis and then backing down. Crises, he maintains, "are public events carried out in front of domestic political audiences" (p. 577). When a leader insincerely threatens to use force in a conflict and her bluff is called, forcing her to back away from her commitment, she suffers a "diplomatic humiliation" that may cost her public support (p. 580). Smith (1998) maintains that domestic audiences use foreign policy outcomes to judge the competency of their leaders

and that backing down from a threat is seen as a sign of incompetence. Guisinger and Smith (2002) contend that domestic audiences punish leaders for destroying the country's reputation for honest diplomacy by bluffing. In all cases, domestic publics have an incentive to remove leaders that fail to make good on threats, and the comparative fragility of democratic government tenure discourages democracies from sending insincere signals about their resolve.

Schultz (1998, 2001b) advances an argument with similar implications for dispute escalation, but posits a different causal mechanism. He argues that democratic governments are more selective about making threats because opposition parties within democratic states have an incentive to call the government's bluff if the state is not really willing and able to wage war. At the same time, when democratic governments do have the support of domestic opposition parties, the credibility of a threat is "confirmed" by a second signaler. The audience cost and reputation theories advanced by Fearon, Guisinger, and Smith depend on the ability and willingness of domestic publics to remove leaders that back down after escalating a dispute. The approach taken by Schultz maintains that democracies are less *able* to issue insincere threats due to the transparency of their political processes.

HYPOTHESES

A number of scholars have addressed the methodological issues inherent in attempts to test arguments based on a strategic selection process (Danilovic, 2001; Fearon, 2002; Gartner and Siverson, 1996; Reed, 2000; Schultz, 2001a; Signorino, 1999; Smith, 1996, 1998, 1999). Because the outcomes observed are hypothesized to be the result of a process of strategic choice, our observations are censored, creating problems for direct tests of the existence of costs that are anticipated off the equilibrium path (Schultz, 2001a). One response to this dilemma is to employ econometric techniques that attempt to correct for problems of strategic selection and censored observations (Reed, 2000; Signorino, 1999; Smith, 1999). An alternative approach, and the one that we adopt in this study, employs a more theoretical solution. In this approach, we endogenize selection effects, deducing hypotheses about the outcomes we expect to observe *given selection bias* (Danilovic, 2001). These hypotheses can then be used to test indirectly for the existence of costs that would otherwise be only partially observable (Schultz, 2001a).

Figure 1 illustrates the process of selection behind the dispute outcomes we observe. Dispute initiators select themselves into a militarized dispute by threatening or using military force and select themselves out by dropping their demands. Targets have no choice about the escalation of a conflict to a militarized dispute, but they can select themselves out of a dispute by making concessions to the dispute initiator either before or after

FIGURE 1 A Selection Model of Dispute Escalation and De-Escalation.

force is used against them. While either state can choose to escalate the dispute by using force unilaterally, a mutual hostilities outcome requires that both states select conflict escalation.

In proposing the following hypotheses, we make three assumptions. First, we assume that both initiators and targets prefer target acquiescence to target capitulation. Second, we assume that *resolved* actors, whether dispute initiators or targets, always prefer mutual hostilities to making concessions. Finally, we assume that *unresolved* actors always prefer to back down before a conflict escalates to mutual hostilities. Later, we relax the last assumption to allow for the possibility that unresolved targets may sometimes prefer mutual hostilities to capitulating after they have been attacked, even though they prefer acquiescence to mutual hostilities.

Initiator Regime Type

The escalation of a conflict to a militarized dispute is likely to be a particularly costly signal for democratic states. Democracies have domestic political incentives to avoid costly, risky wars and, consequently, are less likely to escalate conflicts when they anticipate high costs if the target fights back. At the same time, democratic leaders are less willing to make insincere threats to use force because opposition parties within the state have an incentive to

call the government's bluff when there is domestic dissent (Schultz, 2001b). When democracies do choose to escalate a conflict by threatening another state with the use of force, their action is likely to communicate genuinely high levels of resolve and a domestic consensus supportive of using force if necessary.

Resolved targets always resist making concessions after an initiator threatens to use force because they are willing to fight over the issue at stake. However, some *unresolved* targets also resist, not because they are prepared to fight, but because they think the initiator is bluffing. The transparency of democratic regimes makes bluffing less likely and allows domestic opposition parties to confirm the sincerity of genuine threats. This increases the efficacy of threats, allowing unresolved targets to select themselves out of disputes initiated by democratic states before force is used against them, and lowering the probability that an unresolved target will mistakenly resist a sincere threat, believing it to be a bluff.

> Hypothesis 1: *Targets are more likely to acquiesce when the dispute initiator is a democracy.*

A democratic threat to use force is more likely than a threat issued by a nondemocracy to convince an *unresolved* target to select itself out of a dispute before force is used. Consequently, those targets that do not acquiesce to the demands of democratic dispute initiators are: 1) more likely to be resolved to use force than the targets of nondemocratic dispute initiators, and 2) less likely to capitulate *after being attacked*.

> Hypothesis 2: *Targets are less likely to capitulate when the dispute initiator is a democracy.*

The argument above assumes that dispute initiators attempt to attain their objectives by threatening to use force before resorting to the use of force. This is a reasonable assumption given that, empirically, genuine "surprise attacks," which occur without evidence of prior attempts to signal resolve, are extremely rare (Axelrod, 1979; Reiter, 1995). Nevertheless, because an unknown proportion of disputes do begin with the use of force (see Figure 1), we could find evidence to support our first and second hypotheses, not because the democratic initiators in our dataset are more likely to be believed when they threaten to use force, but because nondemocracies are more likely than democracies to forgo threats and move immediately to the use of force. While the data do not allow us to distinguish between these two possibilities, this alternative scenario is fully consistent with our theoretical argument.

A state may prefer to initiate the use of force without warning if they hold one or both of the following beliefs: 1) the target is willing to fight over the issues at stake and a threat would only cede the initiative to the target, or 2) a threat would not be credible. Otherwise, a potential dispute initiator

should prefer to issue a preliminary threat, rather than to launch a surprise attack, because attaining concessions without the cost of employing force is better than attaining those concessions after a costly expenditure of resources. As a result, states with the *ability* to send credible signals of their resolve (e.g., democracies) should be more likely to attempt to achieve their objectives by threatening to use force before actually employing force. And disputes with democratic initiators should be more likely to end in target acquiescence and less likely to end in target capitulation.

Ignoring the effects of selection bias, arguments about the war-cost sensitivity of democratic states would lead us to predict that both democratic initiators and democratic target states should be more likely than nondemocratic states to back down to avoid dispute escalation. However, we argue that democratic states are less likely to escalate a nonviolent conflict to a militarized dispute if they are not genuinely resolved to fight over the issues at stake. As a result, democracies should be less likely than nondemocracies to drop their demands and select themselves out of a dispute (i.e., back down) when they have *initiated* a dispute by being the first to threaten, display, or use military force against their adversary.

> *Hypothesis 3:*   *Democratic states are less likely than nondemocratic states to back down after escalating a conflict to a militarized dispute.*

The effect of regime type on the escalation of a dispute to mutual hostilities is more difficult to anticipate. If democratic initiators are more likely to follow through on their threats when they experience target resistance (Hypothesis 3), the probability of a dispute escalating to mutual hostilities should increase as the probability that the initiator backs down decreases. However, we suspect that sometimes targets that prefer "acquiescence" to "mutual hostilities" mistakenly resist a sincere threat, but then fight back after they are attacked because the domestic political cost of capitulation is too high. These are cases in which a dispute initiator that is able to send a credible signal of resolve could avert escalation of the dispute to mutual hostilities. If democracies are more likely to be believed when they threaten to use military force, disputes with democratic initiators should have a higher probability of target acquiescence (Hypothesis 1) and a lower probability of both target capitulation (Hypothesis 2) and mutual hostilities. Given these competing influences, we have no *a priori* expectation about the effect of initiator regime type on the probability of mutual hostilities.

Target Regime Type

In the population of all states, democracies anticipate higher war costs on average than nondemocracies. However, because they are selective

about the conflicts they escalate, democracies *initiate* militarized disputes only when their expected war costs are low. For democratic dispute initiators, war cost sensitivity and transparency make conflict escalation a more effective signal of resolve. But targets, by definition, are not the first to escalate a conflict to a militarized dispute. As a result, in contrast to the population of democratic dispute *initiators*, democratic dispute *targets* are likely to anticipate higher war costs, on average, than nondemocratic targets. At the same time, the transparency of democratic polities may enable potential dispute initiators to select particularly unresolved democratic targets. We therefore expect democratic targets to be more likely than nondemocratic targets to select themselves out of the disputes in which they are targeted by making concessions. And we expect disputes with democratic targets to be less likely to escalate to mutual hostilities.

> *Hypothesis 4:*   *Democratic targets are more likely than nondemocratic targets to acquiesce or capitulate.*

> *Hypothesis 5:*   *Disputes with democratic targets are less likely to escalate to mutual hostilities.*

CONTROL VARIABLES

DISPUTE ISSUE

The issues at stake in a conflict are likely to influence dispute outcomes (Sullivan, 2004). For example, scholars have shown that territorial disputes are more likely than any other type of dispute to escalate to war (Diehl, 1999; Hensel, 1999; Huth, 1996; Vasquez, 1993, 1995). Targets and initiators likely see territorial issues as particularly salient, making initiators' threats to use force to gain territory more credible, and targets more resolved to fight back if attacked. Disputes in which the initiator demands a regime change in the target state, although rare, should also be particularly salient for the targeted regime. Consequently, we predict that disputes in which the initiator seeks a change in either the territorial status quo or the target's regime will be more likely to escalate to mutual hostilities because targets will be less likely to make concessions. We also control for an interactive effect between the dispute issue and the target's regime type. Because they have higher anticipated war costs on average, democracies should be especially likely to back down when the demand made by the dispute initiator does not threaten vital interests. Conversely, democratic targets may be just as likely as nondemocratic targets to fight when vital interests are at stake.

JOINT DEMOCRACY

Our theoretical arguments anticipate that target and initiator regime type will have independent effects on dispute outcomes. However, there may also be an interactive effect. In fact, a majority of the empirical research on the democratic peace has suggested that the effect of democracy is dyadic, rather than monadic. Consequently, we include joint democracy as a control variable in the model.

CAPABILITIES

The credibility of a threat is likely to vary with the proportion of power held by the initiator. Threats made by stronger nations may be more credible than those made by weaker states. Consequently, targets should be more likely to acquiesce when a stronger state threatens to use force and less likely to capitulate after they have been attacked by a strong state.

ALLIANCE TIES

The existence of an alliance between two states may improve communication and reduce the probability that a dispute will escalate to either a unilateral or mutual use of force.

CONTIGUITY

Shared borders are important predictors of hostilities between states (Bremer, 1992; Maoz and Russett, 1992). Greater distances between states may mitigate the ability of dispute initiators to project force (Boulding, 1963; Bueno de Mesquita, 1981), lowering the credibility of their threats to use force. At the same time, when states share a border, both sides are apt to perceive any conflicts that arise between them as more threatening to their vital interests. Contiguity may therefore make targets less likely to offer concessions, increasing the probability that a dispute will escalate to mutual hostilities.

DATA

We use the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data sets (v 3.02) (Ghosn and Bennett, 2003; Ghosn and Palmer, 2003; Gochman and Maoz, 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer, 1996; Small and Singer, 1982), analyzing all disputes initiated between 1816 and 2001. We generate dispute dyads, our unit of analysis, with the Expected Utility Generation and Data Management Program Version 3.03 (Bennett and Stam, 2000). Dispute dyads comprised of dispute originators and states that

became part of a MID after the first day are not included in the analysis since our interest lies in the response of the target state to the original dispute initiation (a model that includes states that join a dispute after day one produces almost identical estimates—results not shown). We rely on the standard Correlates of War MID definition of dispute initiation: the state that first crosses the force threshold with the threat, show, or use of military force is the dispute initiator (Jones, et al., 1996). Our dataset consists of 2665 dispute dyads.

Dispute Outcome

We code our dependent variable, dispute outcome, in two stages. First, we determine whether or not the dispute initiator attains its objective in the dispute. Dispute initiators seeking a *revision* of the status quo are considered to have achieved this goal if the Correlates of War MID dataset indicates that 1) the initiator was victorious, 2) the target yielded, or 3) a compromise agreement was reached. Initiators demanding a revision of the status quo are coded as failing to achieve their objective when 1) the target is victorious, 2) the initiator yields, or 3) the dispute ends in a stalemate or release. Dispute initiators trying to *maintain* the status quo are considered to have successfully maintained the status quo if the Correlates of War MID dataset indicates that 1) the initiator was victorious, 2) the target yielded, or 3) the prewar status quo did not change (stalemate and release). Dispute initiators making status quo demands are coded as failing to maintain the status quo when 1) the target was victorious, 2) the initiator yielded, or 3) a compromise was negotiated. Our results are robust to coding variations and sampling choices, such as coding a status quo initiator as succeeding when a compromise agreement is reached, or excluding "compromise" and "release" outcome cases (results not shown). Disputes in which the COW MID dispute outcome is missing or coded "unclear" (96 cases) and cases in which the dyad joins an ongoing war (24 cases) are coded as missing at this stage.

Next, we create four mutually exclusive outcome categories. We code all cases in which both sides use military force as "mutual hostilities" outcomes. Cases in which the initiator attains its objective are then divided into two categories. When initiators achieve their objectives after threatening to use force, but before employing force, the outcome is "target acquiesces." When initiators achieve their objectives *after* using military force, the outcome is "target capitulates." All cases in which the initiator does not attain its objective are coded "initiator backs down" unless the dispute escalates to mutual hostilities.

Out of 2665 cases, 92 (3%) are missing this final dispute outcome code. Of the remaining cases, the target acquiesced in 392 cases (15%), the target capitulated in 306 cases (12%), the initiator backed down in 1126 cases (44%), and 749 cases (29%) escalated to mutual hostilities.

Regime Type

We employ the Polity IVe (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) data set to obtain democracy scores for states in each dispute dyad (see also Gurr et al., 1989; Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). We utilize a continuous measure created by subtracting a regime's autocracy score from its democracy score to produce a 21-point scale, a common convention in the literature (e.g., Maoz and Russett, 1993; Bennett and Stam, 1996). The polity score for one or both states is missing in 118 (4%) of our 2665 cases.

Dispute Issue

The MID data set codes whether or not the dispute initiator sought a revision of the status quo and, if the dispute initiator is a revisionist state, categorizes the type of revision sought as territorial (31%), policy (60%), regime (8%), or "other" (1%) (Jones, et al., 1996). We create a series of dummy variables indicating whether the dispute involves an initiator making 1) a policy demand, 2) a demand likely to engage the vital interests of the target regime (i.e., a territory or regime change demand), or 3) a demand that the status quo be maintained. In the models estimated below, status quo demand is the omitted category. We control for the possibility that the behavior of democratic targets varies with the salience of the initiator's demand by interacting a dummy variable indicating the target is a democracy with a dummy variable indicating when the initiator has demanded a territorial or regime change.

Capabilities

The Correlates of War composite national capabilities index (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, 1972) is a measure of the proportion of total system capabilities that a state holds in six areas: iron and steel production, urban population, total population, military expenditures, military personnel, and energy production. We calculate the ratio of the initiator's proportion of system military-industrial capabilities to those held by both states in the dyad (Stam, 1996).

Alliance Ties

A dichotomous variable indicates the existence of an alliance agreement between the dispute initiator and the dispute target. The data come from the Correlates of War Alliance Data v. 3.03 (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004), which records all formal security alliances between states.

Contiguity

The proximity of the states in a dispute dyad is indicated by a contiguity variable from Correlates of War Direct Contiguity Data v. 3 (Stinnett et al., 2002) that contains six ordered categories. Our models sacrifice a degree of specificity for parsimony by including a dichotomous control variable that simply indicates whether or not the dyad is contiguous by land.

RESULTS

We employ maximum likelihood estimation and multinomial logit models, methodology appropriate for the nominal nature of the dependent variable and our expectation that the effect of the explanatory variables on dispute outcomes is nonlinear. We test our hypotheses with the following basic form:

$$\Omega_{m/n}(x) = \exp(x\beta_{m/n})$$

Where $\Omega_{m/n}(x)$ is the odds of dispute outcome m versus dispute outcome n given x, an array of values for our independent variables. $\beta_{m/n}$ is a vector of coefficients indicating the influence of each explanatory variable on the odds of dispute outcome m versus n (Long, 1997).

Table 1 presents multinomial logistic regression estimates for our dispute outcome model. The table shows estimates for three of the dispute outcomes (target capitulation, initiator backs down, and mutual hostilities) contrasted with the target acquiescence outcome. The first column, for example, presents the estimated effects of each of the independent variables on the likelihood that the outcome of a dispute will be capitulation versus acquiescence of the target. One can compute all other contrasts directly from these estimates and we look at contrasts for all outcomes of substantive interest in the interpretation of our results. Because the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable in a logit model is nonlinear and varies over the range of values of the independent variables, the coefficients cannot be interpreted as directly as they can be in OLS regression models. Nevertheless, positive coefficients indicate that increases in a given variable raise the likelihood that the dispute will end in the indicated outcome, while negative coefficients signify that the variable decreases the likelihood of that outcome, relative to the base category, target acquiescence (Long, 1997).

To test whether or not the independent variables significantly improve fit, we calculate likelihood-ratio (LR) tests on a series of nested models. The probability that all of the coefficients associated with a given variable are zero is less than .005 for all but one variable, alliance ties, which does not have a significant effect on any of the dispute outcomes.

TABLE 1 Multinomial Logit Estimates of Dispute Outcomes, 1816–2001

Variable	Target Capitulates vs. Target Acquiesces		Initiator Backs Down vs. Target Acquiesces		Mutual Hostilities vs. Target Acquiesces	
	b	*SE b*	*b*	*SE b*	*b*	*SE b*
Democratic Initiator	−0.038**	0.012	−0.040***	0.011	−0.042***	0.011
Democratic Target	0.019	0.013	0.037**	0.011	−0.002	0.012
Salient Demand	1.234***	0.275	4.003***	0.288	2.301***	0.242
Policy Demand	0.056	0.192	3.831***	0.216	0.938***	0.169
Other Demand	0.864	0.578	3.946***	0.485	0.887	0.542
Salient* Dem Target	−1.828**	0.653	−0.371	0.407	0.292	0.410
Relative Capabilities	−0.770**	0.245	−0.674**	0.219	−0.624**	0.220
Contiguous Dyad	−0.361*	0.170	0.172	0.147	0.887***	0.146
Jointly Democratic	−1.202**	0.427	−0.814**	0.273	−0.967**	0.317
Constant	0.247	0.180	−1.503***	0.228	−0.333	0.177
N	2459					
LR chi^2(27)	1113.15					
Prob > chi^2	0.0000					
Count R^2	0.569					
Adjusted Count R^2	0.233					

Note: Two-tailed tests of significance:
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
***p < .001.

Because this variable has no effect on our results, we drop it from the analysis reported in Table 1. The LR tests show that relative military-industrial capabilities, dispute issue, and contiguity all have a significant effect on militarized dispute outcomes. In addition, both initiator and target regime type have significant, independent effects on dispute outcomes (p < .001), even after controlling for dispute issue, military-industrial capabilities, joint democracy and contiguity. The interactive variable indicating that the dispute has a democratic target facing a salient demand and the joint democracy interactive term are significant at p < .005.

The model correctly predicts 57% of the dispute outcomes in our dataset, 23% more of the cases than can be predicted by choosing the modal outcome category. Hausman tests of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption indicate that the outcomes are independent of one another. To facilitate interpretation, we convert the coefficient estimates into changes in the predicted probability of each dispute outcome as we change the value of key independent variables, holding the value of all other variables at their median value. Table 2 summarizes these results.

The presence of an interactive term that includes both of our key explanatory variables complicates interpretation of the effects of these variables on dispute outcomes. For this reason, we also present Table 3, in which the predicted probability of each dispute outcome is calculated for all four

TABLE 2 Change in Predicted Probability of Dispute Outcomes

	Dispute Outcome			
Change in variable value	Pr(target acquiesces)	Pr(target capitulates)	Pr(initiator backs down)	Pr(mutual hostilities)
From autocratic to democratic initiator	+.19	−.09	−.02	−.08
From autocratic to democratic target	−.06	+.07	+.04	−.04
From status quo demand to salient issue demand	−.33	−.17	+.42	+.08
From status quo demand to policy demand	−.29	−.25	+.63	−.08
From noncontiguous to contiguous initiator	−.07	−.14	n.s.	+.21
From jointly autocratic to jointly democratic dyad	+.34	−.19	−.01	−.18
From .2 to .8 ratio of initiator to target capabilities	+.10	−.07	−.01	−.02
From SQ to salient demand when target is democratic	−.29	−.35	+.43	+.21

Note: Changes in predicted probabilities are calculated with all variables but the variable of interest held at their median values.

TABLE 3 Predicted Probabilities of Dispute Outcomes as Regime Type Varies

		Target	
		Democracy	Nondemocracy
Initiator	Democracy	Pr(T acquiesces) = .73 Pr(T capitulates) = .14 Pr(I backs down) = .05 Pr(mutual hostilities) = .09	Pr(T acquiesces) = .54 Pr(T capitulates) = .24 Pr(I backs down) = .04 Pr(mutual hostilities) = .18
	Nondemocracy	Pr(T acquiesces) = .29 Pr(T capitulates) = .41 Pr(I backs down) = .09 Pr(mutual hostilities) = .21	Pr(T acquiesces) = .35 Pr(T capitulates) = .34 Pr(I backs down) = .05 Pr(mutual hostilities) = .26

Predicted probabilities calculated when all other variables are held constant at their median value. Polity scores were varied from their maximum (10) to their minimum (−10).

combinations of initiator and target regime type while all other variables are held constant at their median value.

Initiators

In Hypotheses 1 and 2, we predict that target states will be more likely to end a dispute peacefully by acquiescing, and less likely to capitulate after force is used against them, when the dispute initiator is a democracy. These hypotheses are based on the anticipation of a selection effect. If threats to use force and other signals of resolve are more credible when made by a

democratic state, unresolved targets should select themselves out of disputes initiated by democracies at a higher rate, making concessions before force is used against them. Those targets that resist making concessions to a democratic dispute initiator should be more resolved to fight back if attacked.

The analysis strongly supports these expectations; democratic initiators are significantly more likely to achieve their objectives without using force and significantly less likely to see their targets back down after being attacked. Holding all other variables constant at their median value, the probability of target acquiescence increases 19%, and the probability of target capitulation decreases 9%, when the dispute initiator is completely democratic. A standard deviation increase in the dispute initiator's level of democracy, centered around the mean, decreases the probability of target capitulation by 3% and increases the probability of target acquiescence by 7%.

The results provide weaker support for Hypothesis 3. As expected, the likelihood that the initiator will back down declines as the initiator's level of democracy increases, but the substantive effect is small. Autocratic initiators are only 2% more likely to back down than democratic initiators. These results are still meaningful, however, because they indicate that democratic initiators are no *more* likely than autocratic initiators to back down after escalating a dispute—a result we would expect to see if democratic dispute initiators feared higher war costs on average than autocratic dispute initiators. Moreover, this finding suggests that capitulation is less likely in disputes with democratic initiators, not because democracies are less likely to use force if they encounter resistance, but because they attain concessions without needing to use force.

While democratic initiators are only slightly less likely to back down than nondemocratic initiators, disputes with democratic initiators are substantially less likely to escalate to mutual hostilities. Holding all other variables constant at their median value, disputes with democratic initiators are 8% less likely than disputes with autocratic initiators to escalate to mutual hostilities. This decline in the probability of mutual hostilities, in combination with the substantial increase in the probability of target acquiescence, suggests that credible signals of resolve can avert conflict escalation by encouraging unresolved targets to back down early in order to avoid the need to choose between capitulating and reluctantly fighting back. Figure 2 illustrates how the probability of target capitulation and the probability of mutual hostilities both decline, as the probability of target acquiescence steadily increases, when the initiator's level of democracy varies from completely autocratic to completely democratic.

Table 3 provides additional support for our hypotheses. Both democratic and nondemocratic targets are considerably more likely to acquiesce when the dispute initiator is a democracy, but the pattern is more pronounced in jointly democratic dyads. While nondemocratic targets are 19% more likely to acquiesce, democratic targets are 44% more likely to acquiesce when the initiator is a democracy versus a nondemocracy. Moreover, the probability

FIGURE 2 Change in Predicted Probability of Dispute Outcomes as Initiator's Level of Democracy Increases.

of either target capitulation or escalation to mutual hostilities declines precipitously when both states are democracies. While the probability of target capitulation is 41% when a nondemocratic initiator challenges a democratic target, this probability falls to 14% when the initiator is a democracy. Similarly, disputes with democratic targets are 12% less likely to escalate to mutual hostilities when the dispute initiator is a democracy.

Targets

While initiator regime type has a consistent effect on dispute outcomes, the effect of target regime type varies with initiator regime type and dispute issue. Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted that democratic targets would be more likely to make concessions than nondemocratic targets and that disputes with nondemocratic targets would be less likely to escalate to mutual hostilities. Results from this analysis provide support for both hypotheses when the initiator is defending the status quo, but contradict these expectations when the initiator demands a territorial or regime change.

When the dispute initiator is seeking to maintain the status quo, democratic targets acquiesce or capitulate at a higher rate than nondemocratic targets and the probability of mutual hostilities is significantly lower. Democratic targets are 9% more likely than nondemocratic targets to make concessions to a democratic initiator and equally likely to make concessions

to a nondemocratic initiator. At the same time, the probability of escalation to mutual hostilities declines between five and nine percent when the dispute target is a democracy. The pattern is reversed, however, when the dispute initiator seeks a revision of the target's regime or of the territorial status quo. Under these conditions, democratic targets back down at a lower rate than non-democratic targets, regardless of initiator regime type. Most strikingly, the probability that the target will acquiesce or capitulate is only 7% when a nondemocratic initiator demands land or regime changes from a democratic target. This is 15% lower than the probability of target acquiescence or capitulation for nondemocratic targets. Moreover, democratic targets are more likely than nondemocratic targets to compel the initiator to back down, and more likely to escalate a dispute to mutual hostilities, when the dispute is over territory or governance.

This pattern provides further evidence that democracies are not more pacific in general, but are more selective about the issues over which they are willing to fight. While democratic targets are more likely than nondemocratic targets to select themselves out of disputes with status quo initiators, they are more likely than nondemocratic targets to resist making concessions, and even to escalate the conflict to mutual hostilities, to defend land or regime. In fact, the probability of mutual hostilities is at its highest (41%) when nondemocratic initiators confront democratic targets over land or regime.

JOINT DEMOCRACY

Democratic dyads avoid both the costs of war and the sub-optimal capitulation outcome. The probability of target acquiescence is more than twice as high in democratic dispute dyads as it is in non-democratic dispute dyads, holding all other variables constant at their median value. Just as strikingly, the probability of escalation to a unilateral use of force by the initiator declines from 34% in non-democratic dyads to 14% when both states are democratic. Finally, the probability of a dispute escalating to mutual hostilities decreases from 26% for dyads comprised of two non-democratic states, to less than 9% for democratic dyads. When a democratic state threatens another democracy with the use of force, the threat is often enough to compel the target to back down. *While target acquiescence occurs in only 15% of the cases in our dataset, the predicted probability of target acquiescence is 73% when democratic initiators threaten democratic targets with the use of force to maintain the status quo.*

DISPUTE ISSUE

As anticipated, the type of demand being made by the dispute initiator has a significant effect on the probability of dispute escalation. By far the most striking effect of demand type is on the likelihood that a state backs down after initiating

a militarized dispute. Holding all other variables constant at their median value, dispute initiators are 42% more likely to back down when they make a regime change or territorial demand versus a status quo demand. At the same time, targets are 17% less likely to capitulate and 33% less likely to acquiesce to an initiator demanding a revision of either the target's regime or the territorial status quo. Finally, disputes over land and governance are 8% more likely to escalate to mutual hostilities than disputes with a status quo initiator.

Unlike disputes with salient demands, policy demands make escalation to mutual hostilities less likely. The probability of escalation to mutual hostilities declines 8% when the dispute initiator demands a policy revision versus preservation of the status quo. However, disputes over policy demands are also *less* likely to end in target acquiescence or target capitulation. *Policy disputes do not escalate because initiators making policy demands back down almost 70% of the time.*

CONTIGUITY

Contiguity affects the probability of target acquiescence, target capitulation, and mutual hostilities. Dispute targets are 7% less likely to acquiesce and 14% less likely to capitulate when the target and initiator share a border. As a result, disputes between contiguous states are 21% more likely to escalate to mutual hostilities. This finding suggests that sharing a border with the initiator increases the probability that a target state will consider the dispute issue salient enough to fight over.

CAPABILITIES

Material strength has an effect on dispute outcomes that is similar to, but smaller than, the effect of initiator regime type. As the initiator's proportion of dyadic capabilities increases, the initiator becomes more likely to achieve target concessions *without* using force. An increase in the initiator's military capabilities from 20 to 80 percent of the dyad's combined capabilities increases the probability that the target will acquiesce by 10%, decreases the probability of target capitulation by 7%, and decreases the probability that the dispute will escalate to mutual hostilities by 2%. Like democracies, stronger states have a greater ability to issue credible threats that will convince an adversary to back down before force is employed. But, also like democracies, they are less likely to attain their objectives through the unilateral use of military force.

CONCLUSION

While there is a degree of consensus that shared democracy decreases the probability of war, there has been far less agreement about how regime type affects dispute behavior short of war (Oneal and Russett, 1997; Reed,

2000; see Gowa, 1999 for a critique of the democratic peace proposition). Our results help to explain contradictory findings from previous research on the effect of democracy on dispute outcomes. We find that democratic political institutions have both strong monadic and dyadic effects. Moreover, initiator and target regime type affect dispute outcomes differently, and target regime type has divergent effects on dispute escalation depending on the issue at stake.

Not surprisingly, we find that disputes between democracies are less likely than disputes within either mixed or nondemocratic dyads to escalate to mutual hostilities. But democratic initiators and democratic targets avert dispute escalation in different ways. Democratic dispute initiators are less likely than autocratic initiators to use force in a dispute, not because they are less *willing* to use force, but because they are less likely to find it necessary to use force in order to demonstrate their resolve. Our results provide strong evidence that threats and displays of force are more credible signals of resolve for democratic than for nondemocratic states. If they are not willing to fight, dispute targets are more likely to acquiesce after a democracy issues a threat to use force. Consequently, democratic initiators are significantly more likely than nondemocratic initiators to achieve their objectives *without using force* and disputes with democratic initiators are less likely to escalate to violence.

The results we obtain with regard to the probability of target capitulation are more counterintuitive. In light of strong evidence that democracies are more likely than nondemocracies to win the wars they fight (Gelpi and Griesdorf, 2001; Lake, 1992; Reiter and Stam, 2002, 1998a, 1998b), we might expect states that are attacked by democracies to be *more* likely to capitulate than those attacked by nondemocracies. But we anticipate, and our results show, that democratic dispute initiators are *less* likely than nondemocratic dispute initiators to attain their objectives through the unilateral use of force. We argue that a selection effect makes the population of target states that resist making concessions to a democratic initiator more resolved, on average, than the population of target states that resist making concessions to a nondemocratic initiator. While some unresolved targets resist threats because they do not perceive the threats to be credible, this is less likely to occur when a democratic state issues the threat. Those targets that resist a democratic initiator's threat to use force are more likely to be genuinely resolved and less likely to capitulate after the initiator has used force.

Democratic initiators are always more likely than nondemocratic initiators to stand firm and to achieve their objectives without employing force, but the behavior of democratic targets varies with the type of demand made by the dispute initiator. Democratic targets are more likely to make concessions, and less likely to escalate a dispute to mutual hostilities, when the initiator seeks to maintain the status quo. In contrast, democratic targets are significantly less likely than nondemocratic targets to make concessions to an initiator making a territorial or regime change demand. When the dispute is over land or regime,

democratic targets compel their adversaries to back down at a higher rate and escalate the dispute to mutual hostilities at a higher rate than nondemocratic targets. In fact, the probability of mutual hostilities is at its highest when a nondemocratic initiator demands territorial or regime changes from a democratic target.

The pattern of escalatory and de-escalatory behavior we observe in both democratic dispute initiators and democratic targets provides evidence that democracies are no more pacific than nondemocracies overall, but that they are more *selective* about the conflicts they escalate to violence. Democratic states are less likely to initiate disputes when they are not resolved to use force if they encounter resistance, but they are less likely to back down once they have chosen to escalate a conflict to a militarized dispute. Democracies that become dispute targets select themselves out of disputes at a higher rate, *unless* the dispute initiator demand changes in the target's regime or the territorial status quo. When salient issues are at stake, democratic targets are less likely to back down and much more likely than nondemocratic targets to escalate the dispute to mutual hostilities if the initiator refuses to back down.

Ideally, quantitative studies of dispute outcomes could take into consideration a continuous range of dispute outcomes, from immediate target acquiescence to costly, enduring wars. Although our model falls short of this goal, we believe our expansion of the war/peace dichotomy to include acquiescence, capitulation and backing down is an important step forward. By disaggregating "peaceful" dispute outcomes and employing a selection effects approach, we uncover both strongly monadic and dyadic regime type effects and begin to answer questions about *how* democratic states avoid war.

REFERENCES

Axelrod, Robert (1979). "The Rational Timing of Surprise." *World Politics*, Vol. 32, pp. 228–246.

Bennett, Scott D. and Allan C. Stam (1998). "The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War Outcomes and Duration." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 344–366.

Bennett, D. Scott and Allan Stam (2000). "EUGene: A Conceptual Manual." *International Interactions*, Vol. 26, pp. 179–204. Website: http://www.eugenesoftware.org/

Boulding, Ken (1963). *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*, New York: Harper and Row.

Bremer, Stuart A. (1992). "Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816–1965." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 36, pp. 309–341.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce (1981). *The War Trap*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman (1986). "Reason and War." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4, pp. 1113–1129.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman (1990). "Domestic Opposition and Foreign War." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 747–765.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and David Lalman (1992). *War and Reason*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Randolph M. Siverson (1995). "War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A Comparative Study of Regime Types and Political Accountability." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 89, No. 4, pp. 841–855.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith (1999). "An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, pp. 791–807.

Danilovic, Vesna (2001). "Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 97–125.

Diehl, Paul F., ed. (1999). *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

Downs, George W. and David M. Rocke (1994). "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 38, No. 2, p. 362.

Fearon, James D. (2002). "Selection Effects and Deterrence". *International Interactions*. Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 5–29. [original citation for nonexistent publication]

Fearon, James D. (1994). "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. pp. 577–592.

Fearon, James D. (1995). "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 379–414.

Fortna, Virginia Page (2003). "Scraps of Paper? Agreements and the Durability of Peace. *International Organization*," Vol. 53, No. 337–372.

Gartner, Scott S. and Randolph M. Siverson (1996). "War Expansion and War Outcome." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 4–15.

Gelpi, Christopher F. and Michael Griesdorf (2001). "Winners or Losers: Democracies in International Crisis, 1918–94." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 3, pp. 633–647.

Gibler, Douglas M., and Meredith Sarkees. (2004). "Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Data set, 1816–2000." *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 211–222.

Ghosn, Faten, and Scott Bennett (2003). "Codebook for the Dyadic Militarized Interstate Incident Data, Version 3.0." Online: http://cow2.la.psu.edu.

Ghosn, Faten, and Glenn Palmer (2003). "Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, Version 3.0." Online: http://cow2.la.psu.edu.

Gochman, Charles S. and Zeev Maoz (1984). "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 28, No. 4, pp. 588–614.

Gowa, Joanne (1999). *Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Guisinger, Alexandra and Alastair Smith (2002). "Honest Threats: The Interaction of Reputation and Political Institutions in International Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 175–200.

Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore (1989). "Polity III Codebook." Boulder: University of Colorado.

Hensel, Paul R. (1999). "Charting a Course to Conflict: Territorial Issues and Interstate Conflict, 1816–1992. In *A Road Map to War: Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict*, Paul F. Diehl, ed., pp. 115–146, Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press.

Huth, Paul K. (1996). *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes in International Conflict*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Ireland, Michael J. and Scott Sigmund Gartner (2001). "Time to Fight: Government Type and Conflict Initiation in Parliamentary Systems." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 5, pp. 547–568.

Jaggers, Keith and Ted R. Gurr (1995). "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 469–482.

Jones, Daniel M., Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer (1996). "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1992: Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns." *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 15, pp. 163–213.

Lake, David A. (1992). "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review*, 86, No. 1, pp. 24–36.

Leng, Russell J. (1983). "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Recurrent Crises." The *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 379–420.

Leng, Russell J. (1993). *Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980: Realism vs. Reciprocity*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Long, Scott J. (1997). *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Maoz, Zeev (1984). "Peace By Empire? Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816–1976," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 227–241.

Maoz, Zeev and Nasrin Abdolali (1989). "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, pp. 3–35.

Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1992). "Alliances, Wealth, Contiguity, and Political Stability; Is the Lack of Conflict between Democracies a Statistical Artifact?" *International Interactions*, Vol. 17, pp. 245–67.

Maoz, Zeev and Bruce M. Russett (1993). "Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace, 1946–1986." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 87, pp. 624–38.

Marshall, Monty G. and Keith Jaggers (2002). Polity IV Dataset. [Computer file; version p4v2002] College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland.

Oneal, John R. and Bruce Russett (1997). "The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, pp. 267–293.

Organski, A.F.K., and Jacek Kugler (1980). *The War Ledger*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Partell, Peter J. and Glenn Palmer (1999). "Audience Costs and Interstate Crises: An Empirical Assessment of Fearon's Model of Dispute Outcomes." *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, pp. 389–405.

Powell, Robert (1999) *In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategy in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Reed, William (2000). "A Unified Statistical Model of Conflict Onset and Escalation." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 84–93.

Reiter, Dan (1995). "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen." *International Security*, Vol. 20, pp. 5–34.

Reiter, Dan and Allan Stam (1998a). "Democracy and Battlefield Military Effectiveness." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 259–277.

Reiter, Dan and Allan Stam (1998b). "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 2, pp. 377–389.

Reiter, Dan and Allan Stam (2002). *Democracies at War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rousseau, David L., Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth (1996). "Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–1988." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, pp. 512–533.

Russett, Bruce (1993). *Grasping the Democratic Peace*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schultz, Kenneth A. (1998). "Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, pp. 830–843.

Schultz, Kenneth A. (1999). "Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Perspectives on Democracy and War." *International Organization*, Vol. 53, pp. 233–266.

Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001a). "Looking for Audience Costs." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 32–60.

Schultz, Kenneth A. (2001b). *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Signorino, Curtis S. (1999). "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 93, pp. 279–98.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey (1972). "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty and Major Power War, 1820–1965." In *Peace, War and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Siverson, Randolph M. (1995). "Democracies and War Participation: In Defense of the Institutional Constraints Argument." *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 481–489.

Small, Melvin and J. David Singer (1982). *Resort to Arms*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Smith, Alastair (1996). "To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 16–40.

Smith, Alastair (1998). "International Crises and Domestic Politics." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 92, No. 3, pp. 623–638.

Smith, Alastair (1999). Testing Theories of Strategic Choice: The Example of Crisis Escalation. *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 1254–1283.

Stam, Allan C. (1996). *Win, Lose or Draw*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Stinnett, Douglas M. and Paul F. Diehl (2001). "The Path(s) to Rivalry: Behavior and Structural Explanations of Rivalry Development." *The Journal of Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 717–740.

Stinnett, Douglas M., Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman (2002). "The Correlates of War Project Direct Contiguity Data, Version 3." *Conflict Mangagement and Peace Science*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 58–66.

Sullivan, Patricia L. (2004). "The Utility of Force: War Aims and Asymmetric War Outcomes." Dissertation. Department of Political Science, University of California, Davis.

Vasquez, John (1993). *The War Puzzle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vasquez, John (1995). "Why do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, and Territory." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, pp. 277–93.